Hans Morgenthau *Negotiations or War?*

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Cuba and Berlin

In the specialized vocabulary of nuclear weapons technology the accuracy of missiles is denoted on a scale of what is known as Circular Error Probability (CEP). The CEP of a missile type is determined by test-firing a volley at a fixed point and then measuring the radius of a circular area demarcated so as to embrace the territory within which the most accurate 50 percent of the missiles land. Thus our monitoring of Soviet test firings in the Pacific makes clear that intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) aimed at the US from the USSR during a global war have an even chance of falling within one to 1.5 miles of their target. Soviet medium-range (MRBM) missiles such as those discovered in Cuba are somewhat more accurate and are believed in the Pentagon to have CEP ratings under one mile. But this margin of accuracy does not appear to have the ominous import for US military security that one might have imagined in the anxious hours following the President's TV address on October 22. Each of the MRBM's in Cuba, he warned the country, "is capable of striking Washington . . . or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States," while the anticipated intermediate-range missiles (IRBM's) would be "capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere." However, as the President took care to suggest in observing that Americans, even now, live daily "on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines," the missiles photographed in Cuba "add" to an already clear and present danger, which has existed since Moscow broke our nuclear monopoly and which would long outlive the dismantling of the Soviet missile installations in Cuba. The question of whether or not Soviet access to Cuba for missile

(Continued on page 3)

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Power Grab

★ Khrushchev tried a power grab in Cuba and America clapped him down. As this is written the great event is still developing but, so far, Khrushchev's reaction to Kennedy has been nothing worse than noise and bluster.

Is this explanation too pat and simple? Maybe. But after one of our grimmest weeks in Washington the simple explanation seems to fit the facts better than infinitely more ingenious and cynical theories which are flooding the capital like Los Angeles smog.

After repeatedly hearing President Kennedy (at press conferences), and State Department officials (at off-the-record briefings), insist that minute study of the Soviet build-up in Cuba convinced them it was "defensive," this reporter reached the conclusion that the officials might be wrong but that they were sincere. They showed a startling familiarity with what was going on in and around Cuba. The Administration refrained from interference at some political cost although (again using a personal judgment) Cuba did not seem to be a very threatening issue during a dull and apathetic midterm election.

Then one Tuesday morning (October 16) the President got new information. It was like a physician discovering malignancy under his microscope. The evidence was not conclusive; Kennedy made – and cut short – his Chicago political trip. New pictures showed a startling speed of development. Russians like Gromyko assured Kennedy there were no offensive nuclear installations. US aerial cameras – which can spot a golf ball on a putting green – showed something else. Some flashed by at 500 feet and came back with pictures that convinced the technicians. Suddenly erected installations were in an advanced stage of completion.

This was a power grab in the international chess game. At the rate the sites were growing Washington appeared to have only a week or two to react. Unless checked it seemed that Moscow would nearly double its nuclear striking capacity against the USA and would shake up the whole balance of power, perhaps knocking over a chessman or two. Operating within an area so fuzzy that nobody can strictly define "offensive weapon," "quarantine" or even "war" anymore, Kennedy launched his own melodrama. As by-products he produced a stock-market commotion and a gratifying unanimity of support from Latin American OAS countries; he also knocked an election off the front page in its final weeks and produced ulcers in 998 reporters on the Washington scene.

The Puzzled Press

★ One feature of the affair was minor, but unprecedented. There was no "leak." Down to a quarter hour before the President went on television, after a day of almost unbearable suspense, reporters did not know what, precisely, the crisis was about or whom, exactly, they were to hate. They only learned this as they grabbed advance texts from Pierre Salinger at 6:45, and read them as they loped back to news offices. But prior to that national excitement had reached a pitch where knots of people stood silent, peering in between the tall spikes of the White House railing at the tranquil elms inside and the apparently serene mansion splashed by a sinking sun.

There was a memorable little scene two hours before Kennedy spoke. He came out into the driveway of the west wing to say goodbye in person to Uganda's intelligent, coal-black young premier. Cameramen and newshawks drooled for information; Kennedy seemed absolutely unflustered and unconcerned. He smiled to his guest with courteous dignity and saw him into his beflagged Cadillac; then he turned, smiled aloofly (but pleasantly) at the unhappy press, and moved swiftly back through the doorway – immaculately dressed, brown-haired, quietly reserved. A *very* tough young man.

In general I would guess that Democrats are beneficiaries of the Cuban affair, on the theory that the public rallies round Administrations in world crises. Of course the situation is too fluid to be sure. Specific Republicans benefit by being whisked to the White House for advance "consultation": the egregious Dirksen (Ill.) is one; Senator Kuchel (Calif.) is another. Poor Pat Brown had expected Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and half the Cabinet out to help him beat Nixon in the final weeks but all leaves are cancelled; the President has ended political appearances "for the duration."

Uneducational Elections

★ Personally, we feel Kennedy's speeches are no great loss. He was doing a conscientious job whooping it up for the Democrats and aiding money-raising. He was drawing a correct distinction, as we see it, between his side (liberal) and opponents (conservative). But right down to the end Kennedy was not really trying to educate the public beyond a certain level: he was talking A, B, C's when what it needed was college stuff: what medicare means, why the economy requires a shot in the arm, and how the vicious spiral of unemployment is aggravating social problems all over the country.

An election could be a time of education, but except in a minor way the President has not tried to make it so. The stock market, meanwhile, may rise or fall (it seems to have little connection with reality either way) but unless strong federal expansionary intervention comes, the economy is likely to remain in the doldrums. Even so the public seems to have only a vague notion why.

A serious war scare might stimulate production, but the slack is so great that the economy could probably absorb even that fairly easily. At least until the Cuban situation came along, the crystal ball showed a different image; International Monetary Fund chieftain Per Jacobssen (who has repeatedly called the turn in the past) now argues that it's deflation the world faces, not inflation. And he is deeply disturbed about it.

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THE WEEK

3. Cuba and Berlin; More Defense Spending

ARTICLES

7. Cuba in Soviet Strategy
by Zbigniew Brzezinski

9. Negotiations or War?
by Hans J. Morgenthau

10. Onward to Independence
by Robert Rotberg

11. The Oder-Neisse Line
by Terence Prittie

13. Creeps Grow in Brooklyn
by Dave Berkman

15. Cuba – "Long Live the Revolution!"
by Javier Felipe Pazos Vea

19. Report from the "Red Riviera" – II
by Philip Ben

DEPARTMENTS

23. Books 28. Feiffer 29. Theater
30. Correspondence

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Cuba and Berlin

sites has the potential of altering the strategic balance of power seems crucial to assessing what the present crisis is and is not and where we go from here. For if Cuba now added or could in the foreseeable future add in more than a very marginal way to the Soviet military threat to the US the President would have no choice but to go beyond his "initial" interposition of US strength in pursuing his "unswerving objective" of dismantling the missile installations. And even then, short of direct, all-out assault on his regime, the ties of Castro with Moscow would continue to pose a potential threat that would fan the clamor for invasion.

As Hans J. Morgenthau points out on page nine and as this journal observed on September 17, the distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons in Cuba has relatively little practical military significance. Soviet ICBM's with their larger warheads would do as much damage even if they landed slightly further from their targets as close-range MRBM's or IRBM's based in Cuba. For this reason and because the possibility of defective warheads is equally great in the case of all types of missiles, the same number of MRBM's or IRBM's as ICBM's would have to be targeted against a US military site to insure its destruction. It is said that the warning time available to US retaliatory forces in the event of a Soviet first strike would be cut down from the estimated 15 minutes following the firing of an ICBM to some three minutes needed for an MRBM to reach the US from Cuba. But the US is rapidly moving to a position in which the protection of its strategic forces rests not on warning but on mobility and "hardness" (*i.e.*, encasement in underground silos).

The security of the US against a surprise strike rests primarily on the "hardened" Minuteman, the missile-launching Polaris submarines and airborne-alert bombers, all of which would be relatively secure in a first strike inflicted either by ICBM's or Cuba-based missiles. The distinctive strategic impact of Cuba-based missiles as against Soviet-based ICBM's would be limited to those B-52's stationed on the ground for takeoff on the 15-minute alert and to a few "soft" ICBM's. But this added degree of damage to the B-52's would not affect the retaliatory capacity of the US to destroy most concentrations of civil life in the Soviet Union. Thus a Soviet first strike would be equally implausible with or without missiles in Cuba.

While it is true that if our intelligence were not able to detect preparations for missile launchings, short-range missiles in Cuba could be fired with less warning time than Soviet-based ICBM's, they could not be fired with less warning time than missiles fired from submarines now in the Atlantic; and when the Russians have enough

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submarines to strike at all of our air bases, then Cuba will not have even marginal military utility.

The Russian missiles which have so far been sighted in Cuba are said to include some of a mobile character, but none have been reported to be of the truck- or railroad-mounted variety. Nor are any in invulnerable hardened missile sites. Weapons experts seem therefore to believe that the US could keep track of their locations and could mount a coordinated attack which would be extremely likely to knock them all out on the ground. Such an attack, moreover, would not need to employ nuclear weapons or missiles and could be mounted by fighter bombers, which are constantly in the area, without giving the Russians in Cuba sufficient time to get their missiles off the ground. Finally, if missiles were fired from Cuba in a first strike prior to salvos fired from Moscow, this would give the game away and alert our retaliatory forces.

Given the implausible assumption of a first strike the use of Cuban missile pads would offer certain advantages. First, they are cheaper. Weapons analysts estimate that to have a 50-50 chance of landing a megaton warhead within, let us say, a mile of the White House would cost the Russians 10 to 100 times more if they had only their European and Asiatic bases than if they also had Cuban bases. Second, the missiles are available – now, not in one, two or five years. The Soviets are believed to have between 50 and 100 ICBM's, some of old and unreliable types. Reliable estimates of their IRBM and MRBM strength do not appear to be available, but it is known that these weapons have been in regular production for at least five years. Total Soviet strength in these missiles may be as high as 500 – though estimates of 100-200 are more common. To be able to deploy these weapons against the US as well as Europe would in some measure compensate the USSR for its failure to date to develop an operational Polaris-type submarine and for its limited long-range bomber capability (estimated at 150 planes).

"Drop It!"

Yet despite these advantages, even the deployment of several hundred MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba (and current estimates indicate only about 30 MRBM's with no evidence pro or con of nuclear warheads) would not enable the USSR to mount a surprise counterforce attack on the US which would neutralize more than a small fraction of our retaliatory strength.

Neither would missiles in Cuba be of great value in deterring a US first strike against the Soviet Union, which might appear in Soviet eyes to be a distinct possibility if the Russians are planning a major move in Berlin. Missiles in Cuba would slightly complicate such a US first strike by adding to the number of points which had to be attacked and by vastly increasing the area in which the targets were located, but this is a manageable technical difficulty that could be overcome with some planning. The degree of difficulty would depend on the speed with which the Cuban-based missiles could be fired.

A Psychological Deterrent?

But why then have the US and the USSR risked so much over Cuba if it has so little military significance? Despite the fact that a US attack on Cuba would surely be initiated by "neutralizing" the rocket sites, some observers believe that the Soviet missile installations were intended to serve as a psychological deterrent to US invasion. After all, it is argued, the Air Force might not expect to hit all of the Cuban missiles, and the US could not be sure that even Soviet technicians in control of the missiles might not fire a few pot shots at Washington. Washington might therefore conclude that the prize (toppling Castro) would not be worth the possible price. In this view it is noted that Mr. Khrushchev had no doubt already set in motion the machinery for supplying missiles to Cuba before the President's warnings of September 4 and 13, and could not for reasons of internal Communist bloc politics reverse his decision to accommodate the White

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House. This does not by itself constitute a satisfactory explanation against the larger background of the Berlin crisis; and though we differ with Zbigniew Brzezinski in his suggestion that Soviet access to Cuba tips the strategic balance of power, his argument on page seven that Moscow has sought to use Cuba for leverage in a Berlin settlement seems to us persuasive.

The President observed pointedly on October 22 that Cuban missiles would expose Latin America to an explicit nuclear threat for the first time. In this respect, he did identify a new military – and political – factor of great importance. But the impotence of the US in the face of a Soviet nuclear base in its own hemisphere and the consequent damage to worldwide US prestige was not the crux of the President's concern. His emphasis centered on the fact that the Soviet Union had disregarded his September warnings. He was seeking to make good on his word and to draw the line against Soviet power at a time and place of his own choosing. If the inevitable showdown lay ahead in Berlin, where the Soviet Union held the tactical trump cards, why not seize the initiative under circumstances more favorable to the US? It was not so much the missiles themselves as their "secret, swift . . . sudden, clandestine" importation. If this had gone unchallenged in the face of his warnings, "our courage and our commitments" could never again be trusted.

This may be hyperbole but it has an element of truth in it. Although this journal has called our Cuba policy into continual question for the past three years it must be agreed that once the September 4 and 13 statements were on the record the die had been cast. The US could not have let the building of missile sites go on unimpeded. Those questions which can now properly be raised have to do with the limits to be placed on the US response. Invasion was not ruled out on October 22. But the President did not commit the US to the overthrow of the Castro regime. No mention was made of the Monroe Doctrine. Soviet military aid to Castro was not declared incompatible with US security. The issue was drawn so as to reinforce rather than supersede the September statements.

British and Latin American support for the US in the OAS and the UN has exceeded all expectations, but Latin support would be dissipated if the issue were to be broadened. Here it is significant that the OAS resolution was altered before passage to allay Mexican, Brazilian and Bolivian fears that phraseology of the original resolution could have been interpreted as sanctioning invasion. Professor Morgenthau balances the claims of power and prudence when he urges that the US should be prepared for accommodation at the UN. This should in our view not preclude US consideration of dismantling our marginal Jupiter missile sites in Turkey in exchange for similar Soviet action in Cuba. If anything, the US base in Turkey would appear to be more readily expendable to the US than the Cuban base would be to the USSR in view of the disproportionate emphasis on MRBM's, noted above, in the Soviet arsenal. Still the fact that Moscow can maximize the impact of its stock of MRBM's through access to Cuba does not necessarily rule out a Turkey-Cuba bargain, for the loss of Cuba would not, as already argued, affect the basic strategic balance between the US and the USSR.

Limited Objectives

When one looks back on the events leading up to the President's blockade order it is apparent that unnecessary risks were taken and that the Soviet Union was very nearly backed into a corner from which there was no face-saving escape. Gromyko has been held to blame by the President for insisting on October 18 that the Soviet buildup in Cuba was not "offensive." Yet there's something odd here. At 9 a. m. on Tuesday, October 16, the President was given "preliminary hard information" by our intelligence on the missile sites. Two days had elapsed before he talked with Mr. Gromyko for over two hours. The fact that he did not confront the Soviet Foreign Minister with even the "preliminary hard information" has been informally defended with the argument that verification was still proceeding and that to have gone off half-cocked would have been the worst sort of irresponsibility. Perhaps so. But one is left with the suspicion that the decision to proceed on October 22 had already been made and that it was considered expedient to leave Mr. Gromyko open to the charge of duplicity.

The challenge presented by Soviet disregard of his warnings was real. The President had to act. He was acting, however, not against the actual military threat of Soviet missiles but against their implicit political challenge; and having made his point, as it were, by demonstrating his willingness to risk the use of force, the President was left to accomplish his objectives in the end at the bargaining table. His carefully circumscribed objectives in Cuba must remain limited if they are to be attained. The most disturbing aspect of recent events has been the sudden spread of a fatalist acceptance of ineluctable nuclear collision. The atmosphere has had a touch of Giraudoux's *Tiger At the Gates*. "When destiny has brought up two nations," Hector told Ulysses, "as for years it has brought up yours and mine, to a future of similar invention and authority, and given to each a different scale of values, the universe knows destiny wasn't preparing alternative ways for civilization to flower. It was contriving the dance of death, letting loose the brutality and human folly which is all the gods are contented by."

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More Defense Spending

Despite a lot of corridor talk about the possibility of all-out nuclear war before Christmas, Pentagon officials are naturally hedging their bets. Just in case the world turns out to be simmering along in its traditional manner when Congress reconvenes in January, they are now preparing another "peacetime" budget for fiscal '64 (*i.e.* June, 1963-June, 1964).

In principle this budget will be reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget and by assorted Congressional committees and subcommittees. But in point of fact the Bureau has neither the staff nor the expertise to provide a careful review, and few Congressmen know enough to discuss the military budget coherently. The only real effort to cut and coordinate the demands of the three semi-autonomous military services is therefore the effort now being made by the Secretary of Defense and his staff (within which the Comptroller, Charles Hitch, is probably the key figure when budget problems arise).

Although McNamara has done more than any previous Secretary of Defense to coordinate Army, Navy and Air Force projects, and with the help of Hitch and his costs analysts has found ways to save an estimated $750 million in fiscal '63 and hopefully as much as $3 billion by '66 or '67, the Pentagon budget will continue to rise.

In good part this is because wages have gone up, both for the Pentagon employees and for the engineers, technicians and craftsmen who design and build new hardware. Partly the rise comes from the replacement of simple hardware by more complex. Together these two factors account for an annual increase of perhaps $1.5 billion. In addition, President Kennedy has insisted on more missiles and more of a buildup in conventional forces than President Eisenhower had thought necessary.

During his first year in office the President increased Polaris missile strength by 50 percent, Minuteman production capacity by 100 percent, and put more B-52's on ground alert. He also increased the number of combat ready Army divisions from 11 to 16, increased the Army's air and sea mobility, and boosted its tactical air power.

This has meant increasing the defense budget for the fiscal year which ended last June to $46.8 billion, which was $3.7 billion more than Ike had already committed us to for that period. For this fiscal year ending next June expenditures will rise to an estimated $48.3 billion and for the year ending in June, 1964, it is expected to top $50 billion.

These figures exclude about $1.5 billion for military assistance to foreign countries and about $2.8 billion for atomic energy. They refer to actual expenditures, not to "new obligational authority," which has risen even faster than expenditures since Ike went back to Gettysburg. (Kennedy's NOA request for '63 was $8.6 billion more than Eisenhower's for '62.) The difference is that NOA for '63 includes payments under contracts made during fiscal '63, even though actual payments may not be made until 1965. It excludes payments made during 1962, on contracts let during 1960.

Despite some hopeful talk last year from Secretary McNamara about reaching a "plateau" of defense spending, increases on the order of $2 billion a year (or about four percent per annum) seem likely for the forseeable future. Indeed, keeping military expansion down even to four percent is as hard as getting domestic economic expansion up to that level.

Secretary McNamara will be dealing this November with "urgent" requests from his Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force for nearly $60 billion. The Army wants to reorganize itself on a more maneuverable basis, acquiring many more helicopters and other "low-slow" craft. This would cost $15 billion over the next few years. The Navy wants to spend $2.5 billion a year to modernize its fleet, much of which dates from World War II and is older than the boys who man it. The Army, Navy and Air Force have, at McNamara's behest, designed an "all-service" tactical fighter plane, the TFX, which will save money in the long run but will cost $4 billion in the short run. The Air Force is still anxious to have $500 million for the RS-70, and would be glad to spend a similar sum on extra intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Army, which has already spent more than $1 billion on its Nike-Zeus anti-missile program, claims that if it got still more money it might eventually show some results. Others also have their anti-missile schemes, and whatever their technical virtues all seem to cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars to explore. In case none of these pan out (or in case they do and some firebrand concludes that we can afford to start a nuclear war), the Office of Civil Defense would like an extra $300-400 million to put the country underground for a few weeks. Meanwhile the Air Force is worried lest the Russians communize the moon – or the Van Allen belt.

The Air Force wants to go far beyond its present $1.3 billion military space program. The first step would be to step up the $1.5 billion program for developing a Titan III missile.

McNamara is said to be skeptical about many of these ventures, and obviously not all of them will find a place in the budget he presents to the President in December and to Congress in January. But as last year's RS-70 struggle proved, a McNamara veto does not necessarily curtail controversy over a program, even if it curtails the program itself.

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Cuba in Soviet Strategy

by Zbigniew Brzezinski

There would be no Berlin problem if the Soviet Union was a status quo power. It could then allow the reunification of Germany under explicit guarantees for Soviet security. But the Soviet Union is not a status quo power; it is a revolutionary one. Moreover, it is an increasingly self-confident revolutionary power. Precisely because of that it has been willing to run considerable risks to expel us from Berlin, and in this regard the Cuban case becomes both relevant and crucial.

From the Soviet point of view, the Cuban case has two dimensions: the long-range Communist dimension and the immediate Berlin dimension. Insofar as long-range considerations are concerned, the presence of Communism in Cuba undermines the American claim that the Western hemisphere is immune to Communist penetration and that the United States has the capability to exclude Communism from this hemisphere. It thus forces the United States to back down from a traditionally proclaimed position and imposes upon it a humiliation which is bound to have international implications. In addition, it creates within Cuba the economic, political and eventually the military bridgehead for further Communist expansion whenever the revolutionary situation matures elsewhere. To achieve these purposes primarily defensive weapons are initially sufficient.

In the Soviet calculations, however, Cuba has a special and immediate relevance to the Berlin problem, and it is this pertinence that made desirable the deployment of offensive weapons of mass destruction in Cuba. Several advantages pertinent to Berlin were to be attained by the operational positioning of such weapons:

1. An immediate strategic advantage was to be gained by exposing the US to IRBM's which inherently have greater reliability than more distant ICBM's. The warning time for the US in the event of attack would be significantly cut and the Soviets would no longer suffer the handicap of being distant from their targets while we are relatively close to ours.

2. The deployment was to attain a major psychological objective within the United States and within the West in general. It could have the effect of deterring counteraction in Berlin by stimulating widespread fear in the US, as well as creating the global impression that a turning point in the balance of power between the West and the East has been crossed. It would thus directly challenge the relationship of force and will on which the Western position in Berlin rests.

3. It would increase credibility in the seriousness of the Soviet intent to back their Berlin actions with military might, since it would convey unmistakably the degree of risk-taking the USSR is willing to run.

4. It would create the basis for a possible "settlement" since at some future point the Soviet Union might have indicated its willingness to remove these weapons from Cuba in return for a so-called free city in Berlin and even the liquidation of American bases in the proximity of the Soviet frontier. This would have been a major success from the standpoint of the Soviets since the long-range political significance of the Castro regime would not be affected.

A bargain involving the eventual abandonment of Cuba altogether is in fact not possible and it is most unlikely that it was ever seriously considered by the Soviets. They surely realized that Castro would resist on his own. Furthermore, he could not be certain that the Soviets would in fact abandon him once we compromised on Berlin; and the Soviets could not be certain that we would compromise on Berlin if first we were allowed to liquidate Castro. Combining the two is simply not possible. Consequently the Soviet initiative in suddenly pouring offensive weapons into Cuba appears to have had a twofold intent: to improve the Soviet political bargaining position over Berlin and to improve, and perhaps even decisively alter, the strategic position of the Soviet Union in the event of a Berlin showdown. As their minimum objective, the Soviets hoped to exact major concessions in Berlin in return for some adjustments in Cuba; as their maximum, our backdown in Berlin, terrorized and deflected by the sudden revelation of a powerful nuclear threat from Cuba. The Soviets furthermore hoped to confront us eventually with a nuclear challenge by proxy, thereby again avoiding a direct confrontation but benefiting by the challenge.

The timing of the Soviet arms deliveries is a significant clue bearing out the foregoing analysis. The deliveries took place on a large scale in August and September, after the decision to force the Berlin crisis to a head had apparently been reached in Moscow. One may suspect that the Soviets expected that the installations would be completed by December and that the crisis

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could then be set in motion according to the time schedule of the Soviet Union and with all the foregoing factors coming into play.

Our response of October 22 may have come too late to prevent the operational presence of hostile missiles, but fortunately it still came early enough to catch the Soviet technicians and firing crews in control of them. Thus the President's warning to Moscow that a US retaliatory blow against Russia would follow the firing of a single missile from Cuba is not only justified but it denies to Moscow the advantage of the calculated deception involved in a threat by proxy. It warns Khrushchev not to abdicate the ultimate power of deciding whether the USSR is to become a cemetery to a reckless Cuban Fuehrer. The issue is now joined directly between the United States and the Soviet Union, and this until 1962 the Soviets have tried to avoid.

Our initiative, belated as it was, has thus upset the Soviet calculations and their timetable. This is all to the good, for in politics timing is of the essence, and only too often we have allowed the Soviets to dictate it. But the problem is far from resolved. It is still uncertain whether our action was timely enough to forestall a significant nuclear threat to us, capable of altering the present strategic balance. Because we are the status quo power, we cannot afford a strategic parity and must always strive for both nuclear and strategic superiority. The automatic and fashionable equivalents of our bases and theirs simply ignores the intellectually more difficult problem of assessing who is trying to expand and who is primarily favoring the status quo. Never in history has a mutual power relationship involved a complete symmetry in national postures and policy.

We must, therefore, not allow the United Nations debate to result in a "compromise" involving the liquidation of some of our bases unless it is certain that they no longer have any military value. Also, it is still crucial to determine more precisely the degree to which the deployed missiles are armed with nuclear warheads, and to what extent the Soviets are training Cubans to take them over. We cannot depend any longer on the Soviet sense of responsibility in this regard, and we certainly must not wait until Castro himself is in the position to determine matters of peace and war. If the sites are extensive and can still be developed further, in spite of the naval measures, and if the training of Cubans is continuing, then we may have no choice but to destroy this threat before Castro is capable of forcing us to take the measures the President pledged would follow the firing of a single missile from Cuba.

However, our preoccupation with Cuba should not make us lose sight of Berlin. It remains the key and the focal point of conflict. We must therefore be careful that in trying to convince the Russians that we will fight for Berlin, we do not in effect convince them that our primary interest is in preventing a war. This automatically would reduce our credibility and incline the Russians to probe us further with various intrusions to determine whether our objective is primarily to maintain our presence in Berlin, or primarily to avoid a war and at the same time maintain our presence in Berlin. The matter of priorities here is an essential one, although fortunately one Cuban response should have the effect of making the priorities clearer.

Nonetheless, the credibility of our warnings to the Russians has been diminished by our willingness at the same time to negotiate with them about our interests in Berlin. To think of a hypothetical but parallel case, let us imagine that we request the Russians to leave East Europe, that we then put military and political pressures on them, they are in turn faced with their proclamations that they will fight if we invade, but at the same time are also faced by indications of their willingness to negotiate about their presence in Eastern Europe. That would certainly be construed as an encouragement to the continued application of pressure against them.

Leaving aside indirect communication through the adoption of certain unambiguous military postures, it is most desirable to combine our commitment to fight for all of our rights in Berlin with a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets by raising with them issues which pertain to their interests as well. This is a standard technique which they have used against us, and there is urgent reason for using it against them. For example, we could insist that they evacuate East Berlin and East Germany as the only sensible way of changing the status quo without a war. We could even hint darkly that this is the least they have to do to forestall our liquidating Castro. Such a posture would indicate to them that we are willing to take political advantage of a situation made fluid by them. It increases the premium on the status quo, while indirectly indicating that we do not put an absolute value on the avoidance of war. In the end, they may conclude that the status quo is the best bargain after all.

Anything less than that encourages Khrushchev to continue threatening, with the risk that finally he will push. Our task is to indicate that our priorities are first, Berlin and second, avoiding a war, just as in Cuba we have just indicated that our priorities are first, American security and second, avoiding a war. By making these priorities clear, we might achieve both. Otherwise, we could have a war by miscalculation. Of course, this does involve a direct confrontation, but it was imposed upon us and the only way to avoid it was to yield. But this we cannot do because the stakes are too high. We are now in the midst of a showdown, and its outcome will be decisive in determining the pattern, indeed the fate, of the 'Sixties.

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Negotiations or War?

by Hans J. Morgenthau

In order to assess the significance of the action the United States has taken with regard to Cuba, it is necessary to distinguish between the objective grounds justifying the action and the reasons the President has presented in his broadcast of October 22. Cuba is being transformed into a Soviet military base. This transformation has been going on for months, and the recent intelligence upon which the President based his action did not show the situation in a materially altered light. For the distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons with which the President justifies his action now, as he also justified his previous inaction, is irrelevant. Cuba was from the outset intended to be an offensive base, not directed against the physical integrity of the United States but against its political influence in Latin America. Its military installations seek to make that base secure from American armed intervention. The "defensive" weapons serve that purpose directly by being aimed at an invading force, the "offensive" weapons serve it indirectly as an (implausible) threat of massive retaliation. What actually threatens the physical integrity of the United States are Russian missiles based on land and sea. Missiles placed on Cuba add nothing material to that threat; they would be wiped out in the first minutes of a war.

It would, then, seem to follow that if action was indicated last week it was also indicated last month. For the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet military base, however armed, affects the interests of the United States adversely in two different respects. It is detrimental to the political position of the United States in the Western hemisphere in that it challenges American influence in an area which has traditionally been regarded an American sphere of influence. Furthermore, and more importantly, it provides a base for military and political subversion throughout Latin America, thus far immune from outside interference.

The Soviet presence in Cuba, unchallenged until last week, also affects the prestige of the United States as a great power. For if the United States were unwilling to protect one of its vital interests, which has been so regarded for a century and a half, is it likely to protect interests elsewhere, which are of much more recent origin and much more dubious validity? Mr. Khrushchev has told recent visitors that he does not believe that the United States will go to war over Berlin. It is not far-fetched to suggest that this conviction has been nourished in the past by our passivity *vis-à-vis* the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet base.

The case for action has therefore been strong from the outset and may have at best been strengthened by recent intelligence. It is therefore legitimate to ask oneself whether the President's emphasis upon the presence of "offensive" weapons, recently discovered, does not weaken our case. The President's statement seems to carry the implication that once the Soviet military arsenal on Cuba is limited again to "defensive" weapons there will be no grounds for American action. If my analysis of the Cuban threat is correct, this implication is certainly unwarranted.

While this question concerns our long-range policies toward Cuba, last week's action raises acutely the immediate issue of our relations with the Soviet Union. Obviously, the Soviet Union has been directly challenged, and its reaction to that challenge will depend, on the one hand, upon its assessment of the importance of its Cuban position and, on the other, upon its ability to extricate itself from an exposed position without too much loss of face if it should so desire. This issue will put both the determination and the self-restraint of our diplomacy to the test.

What we must aim at is not just the interception of "offensive" weapons destined for Cuba, but the elimination of Cuba as a Soviet military base. And we must seek to achieve this end without compelling the Soviet Union openly to fold its tents and bring its "technicians" home. We must in particular resist the temptation to use the forum of the United Nations as a court of law which is to condemn the Soviet Union as an international evil-doer. Rather, we must try to use the United Nations as an instrument of conciliation and as a face-saving device. One could well imagine the Soviet Union declaring that there are no military installations in Cuba and inviting a United Nations commission to investigate. That commission, arriving in Cuba a few weeks hence, would find nothing since the Soviet Union could remove what was there.

This may well turn out to be an overly optimistic picture of how the issue of Cuba will be settled. If it is, the alternative is grim indeed. For there are only two ways through which nations can protect their vital interests: negotiations or war.

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DR. BANDA LEADS HIS PEOPLE TO THE NEW JERUSALEM

Onward to Independence

Zomba, Nyasaland

When a plush new nightclub opened recently in Blantyre-Limbe, this country's commercial city, its highly touted strip-tease artist appeared on stage fully clothed, by order of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). "Miss Eve Eden," said the official announcement, "was refused a license to strip on the grounds that her act would be repugnant to public morals." Simultaneously Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, Life President of the MCP, demanded that his photographs be removed from bars. He urged his many followers to drink not, and instead to labor faithfully in the service of the new Nyasaland.

Dr. Banda's government (his party controls the local Legislative Council and holds seven of ten seats in the Executive Council) is earnest, immensely energetic, and undoubtedly Victorian. The banning of strippers and beer drinkers only symbolizes the tenor of a regime which intends to transform the British Protectorate of Nyasaland into what Dr. Banda, with some justice, calls "my Malawi." The Ngwazi ("conqueror"), as Dr. Banda is affectionately known, is determined to lead his people forward to the New Jerusalem. His message, and his appeal, is fiercely evangelical and, like the 19th Century gospelers, his vision is apocalyptic.

The Advent for which his people have prayed and fought is fortunately at hand. Dr. Banda, who returned to Nyasaland in 1958 after a long absence, led them in sometimes violent opposition to the hated federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to the British local government.

Released from prison in 1960 Dr. Banda "turned Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod into a Christian gentleman" and then negotiated a new constitution favorable to African aspirations in Nyasaland. Last year he led the MCP to an overwhelming victory in the country's first direct elections (98 percent of those eligible voted). The opposition United Federal Party won a few European seats and candidates for another African party lost their deposits. The MCP immediately assumed control of Nyasaland's destiny under a transitional arrangement whereby it became the party "responsible" for the Protectorate's government while the Colonial Office, through its governor and his secretariat, retained substantive power. In the past year, as the MCP has proven its ability, the governor has progressively exercised less and less control over day to day affairs. The Ngwazi, having given his people a measure of the freedom that they had long sought, personally made most of the important decisions of state.

Next year Dr. Banda will almost certainly lead his people out of Egypt into Israel. In November, after visiting Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, he and his MCP colleagues will meet R. A. Butler, the Secretary of State for Central Africa, in London. They will demand immediate self-government, followed by independence outside the Federation. There is little doubt that these proposals will be greeted hospitably in Whitehall. Both sides will haggle over the economics of secession (the federal government, according to various estimates, injects 1.5 million pounds to 6 million pounds a year into the Nyasaland economy). Britain may well demand some political concessions as the price of its continued financial support. And the final agreement may delay the protectorate's day of independence – when "Nyasaland" becomes "Malawi" – until late next year. But the standard preparatory period of "self-government," on the Tanganyika and Uganda models, will probably begin in January. Dr. Banda will become chief minister and the present chief secretary will become a deputy governor. All the cabinet positions will be filled by MCP nominees. Then, perhaps in August, the Central African Federation will lose its poorest member and Dr. Banda will have the heady satisfaction of having won independence.

Is Nyasaland ready for the responsibilities of sovereignty? During the past year the MCP has surprised British colonial officials and others concerned with the future of the Protectorate. Dr. Banda has gathered an energetic and dedicated team to assist him. Although not all of his colleagues prefer orange crush to beer and whisky, they are all accustomed to the 16-hour working day. While following the Ngwazi loyally, none is a sycophant, and all have been learning the intricate secrets of their ministries while seeking new ways in which to develop Nyasaland into a country capable of sustaining itself without permanent outside assistance.

John Msonthi, the Minister of Trade and Industry, taught at a Roman Catholic secondary school before and after his university days in Delhi. Willie Chokani, the Minister of Labor, taught in a Presbyterian secondary school before and after he, too, studied at Delhi on an Indian government scholarship. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Augustine W. Bwanausi, comes from a Yao family which has been in contact with Presbyterian missionaries for three generations. An outstanding mathematician and physicist who wanted to become a rocket scientist, Bwanausi won the top academic prizes

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at Makerere College, Uganda, and studied at the University of Bristol before returning home to teach secondary school. His brother, Dr. Harry Bwanausi, will probably be Nyasaland's first African medical director.

The actions of W. Kanyama Chiume, the Minister of Education and Social Welfare, have produced the most controversy, but he is also qualified and hard-working. Another Malawi supporter, the Scottish-trained lawyer Colin Cameron, is Minister of Works and Transport. Dr. Banda holds the portfolios of Land, Natural Resources, and Local Government. Orton Chirwa, at 43 the oldest of Dr. Banda's ministerial colleagues, has been Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Justice and is expected to become Minister of Justice in January. He was called to the bar in London, and practiced extensively in Nyasaland before entering politics. Unhappily, Dunduzu Chisiza, a brilliant theoretician who was being groomed as Minister of Finance, was killed in an automobile accident in September. His replacement is not yet announced.

If the top echelon is impressive, the second rank is even more exceptional. Few of the new nations of eastern Africa can boast such a wealth of persons capable of running a developing country. Wherever one travels in Nyasaland one meets district councilors and party leaders who appear to be as keen and effective as those here in Zomba, the capital. The local officials – along the remote shores of Lake Nyasa as well as in the fertile central granary – are busy mobilizing the rural masses for the "big push" that Dr. Banda has demanded. He, too, has asked for sacrifice and plenty of hard work, and in the villages his supporters are rallying the people of Malawi. Taxes have been raised above previous limits. The traditional court system has been streamlined. Colonial administrative functions have been transferred from the British district commissioners to the African district councils. Yet, despite rapid Africanization Dr. Banda still needs European administrators and technical officers and desperately wants them to stay. Racial tension is absent in Nyasaland and, if the next year is as happy as the last, the Ngwazi's Malawi should have little difficulty inspiring the Western world with confidence in its ability to govern itself and to overcome its economic handicaps.

Robert Rotberg

AS ADENAUER STANDS FIRM, HIS BARGAINING POWER FADES

The Oder-Neisse Line

Bonn

The Oder-Neisse Line is once again front page news in Western Germany. The reason for this is the alleged statement by Pope John XXIII to Polish bishops attending the Ecumenical Council in Rome, that he is aware that Poland's "Western provinces" have been "regained after centuries of struggle." The Vatican has neither confirmed nor denied reports about this statement which have been published first in the Polish and later in the West German press. But it is perfectly obvious that the Pope must have been anxious to give the Roman Catholic Church in Poland every support that he could; for the Communist Polish government has only lately re-embarked on an anti-church campaign, closing down Catholic schools and kindergartens, cutting down the amount of religious instruction allowed in the state schools and ejecting nuns from convents which are being partially or wholly closed.

The reports of the Pope's statement have caused considerable worry in Western Germany. For the central feature of the Adenauer foreign policy is that no single part of it can be revised. The Chancellor regards his foreign policy as an integrated whole – like a tapestry or a carpet. If a single strand is removed then the article will disintegrate. His enunciated policy on the Oder-Neisse Line is that the "legal" German claim to the lost provinces to the east cannot be surrendered (or even discussed) prior to the negotiation of an all-German Peace Treaty. Until then the German claim must be upheld – either to be used as a bargaining-counter, or else to be implemented by returning millions of German refugees to their old homes.

In some degree it is not a bad thing that the subject of the Oder-Neisse Line should again become topical at this stage, so that it can be rediscussed in the light of changed circumstances. The principal weakness of the Adenauer foreign policy is that it is hard and inflexible and cannot be reshaped either in Germany's interest or in that of the Western Alliance as a whole. The maintenance of the claim to the old Eastern provinces is typical of this weakness.

In the first place the Federal Government has sought to uphold the claim by means of a conspiracy of general agreement, and by mild but persistent falsification of the facts. The conspiracy of general agreement resulted

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in two leading politicians – Herr von Brentano, the leader of the Christian Democratic Parliamentary Party, and Professor Schmid, the chief Social Democratic spokesman on foreign affairs – being hauled over the coals when they suggested that the Oder-Neisse Line might be bartered for the reunification of the two German states. Their tentative remarks on the subject, some years ago, were treated as major heresies. Von Brentano has never forgotten his subsequent reception by the refugee organizations; this has probably helped to make him into the most orthodox of all Adenauer's lieutenants. No German politician can afford a heresy of this kind, which could cost his party a valuable, possibly vital, section of the refugee vote.

Meanwhile the myth of the "return" of the refugees to their old homes is fostered by every possible means. Refugee newspapers (and there are still a great many of them) continue to write about failures of Polish "colonization" of the provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse, and of the Polish feeling of "Vorlauefigkeit," indeed, of the impermanence of their tenure there. They write, too, of the material decay of industry, agriculture and the townships which used to be purely German. They help the refugee associations to foster the idea of "return" by organizing endless "Treffens" – reunions of East Germans who want to discuss old times and old friends but who must sit and listen to the gospel of their own, inalienable right to their old homes. More than a year ago the Refugee Press Service organized a "Gallup poll" among refugees asking whether they would be prepared to go back to their old homes if the necessary conditions could be created. The Press Service stated afterwards that four out of every five were ready to go back, and that even some West Germans wanted to accompany them in a Teutonic recolonization of the "German East." Heaven knows how this sample poll was organized! But the average expellee to whom one talks is fairly clear that he will never see his old home again.

The refugee organizations have cultivated the subsidiary myth that there are one million, perhaps even two million Germans still living today beyond the Oder-Neisse. This is demonstrably untrue. There may be 150,000 living there who would be ready to regard themselves as primarily German, if German rule were again enforced there. There are Masurians and "Water-Polacks" of mixed ancestry and divided culture. But the essential fact is that five million Poles have simply moved in where seven and one-half million Germans were driven out. Talk of a "limited" return of Germans followed by a Polish-German "condominium" is bunkum. The Poles are the most nationalistic people in Europe; they will not give up one square mile of the territory they gained in 1945.

These are facts which have been plain for a long time past. But there was still much reason in favor of the West German government's argument of keeping a claim intact in order to use it as a bargaining-counter. There are two reasons today for finding this argument outdated. The first is that an all-German peace treaty is as far off as ever – as is German reunification – and that if the German claim to the old Eastern provinces is ever to be used as a bargaining-counter it could better be done as soon as possible, while the claim still retains some tatters of credibility about it. The second reason is that the West Germans are beginning to understand that there may be advantages in establishing closer relations with the countries of the Communist bloc – in particular with a Poland which is the member of the bloc least dominated by the Kremlin. But Poland will only agree to this if the Oder-Neisse Line is recognized.

There is a third, subsidiary reason. The political power of the refugees from the "German East" has declined. The All-German People's Party, which directly represents refugee interests, polled just four percent of the vote in September's Land election in Schleswig-Holstein. Yet nearly one-third of the people of this Land were refugees! They used to hold the balance of political power in it. In other parts of Germany the All-German Party is losing all significance and it has not a single representative in the Bonn Parliament.

The principle of demanding a quid pro quo for recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line is a good one. But the West Germans are only going to be able to get something worthwhile in return if they use their ingenuity – and soon. Chancellor Adenauer is not prepared to begin working out details of an All-German peace treaty. Very well. But he must realize then that the Oder-Neisse claim will make diplomatic progress much more difficult in the meantime. Further delay will only reduce its value as a German bargaining-counter.

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Creeps Grow in Brooklyn

by Dave Berkman

The October 8 *New Republic* note titled "California's Fourth 'R'," commenting on Maxwell Rafferty's campaign for State Superintendent of Public Instruction, seemed to take for granted that Mr. Rafferty's charges against American youth and education were so extreme and absurd that merely to restate them was to refute him. Direct classroom observation of well over 10,000 adolescents in the 37 Brooklyn junior, vocational and academic high schools in which I've taught (as a day-to-day substitute while completing my doctorate) has convinced me that some of his claims have a ring of truth. Like that "ridiculous rightist" in California I have observed a group most of whom are "spineless, luxury-loving, spiritless creeps." I would add: "anti-intellectual, stupid, unaware, unconcerned and selfish."

Please, don't tell me about the exceptions *you* know. As a reader of this journal of opinion, you are an exception. I, too, have seen hundreds of exceptions; but my concern is with the thousands who aren't; and, Daddy-o, like, they outvote *us* every single time! (Incidentally, just last week I taught an honors journalism course at what likes to bill itself as the "best" high school in New York City, in which I asked the kids – a select group with an average interest in journalism – how many ever read *The New Republic*. None. Four of 30 *thought* they'd heard of it.) Still, I don't expect many teachers will agree with my appraisal. If they did, they would have to admit their almost complete professional failure.

There is, however, one towering intellect in these parts who, I am sure, does understand what I'm saying – Murray Kauffman, a New York disc jockey, better known to the hedonistic creeps (the vast majority of New York's teenagers), as "Murray the 'K'." Now only about 10 out of the 50 or so New York City teachers I've asked had ever heard of Kauffman. The other 40 cannot possibly know the children they are teaching, regardless of how many psych courses they have taken. (Abnormal psychology is another matter.)

If the City Fathers who are racking their unimaginative minds trying to find a new school superintendent really want a man who could effectively deal with the kids themselves, they could do no better than Murray Kauffman. For he is, I am convinced, the only man extant who has uncovered the dark secret of how to communicate with today's teenagers, at least in Brooklyn. The hold he exerts is fantastic. In all but one out of perhaps 30 classes where I have asked – and these range from classes for retarded children in the Negro and Puerto Rican slum junior high schools to honors courses in the "better" middle-class academic senior high schools – a majority admitted to listening to his radio show regularly.

While I have only some extremely general notions as to why he gets through to them, of one thing I am certain: Kauffman's popularity has very little to do with what is thought of, in academic circles, as the English Language. A school system which dealt in reality rather than self-delusion would not only hire Murray Kauffman as its head, it would reclassify "English" as a foreign language. When I began my substitute teaching last year, I taught only two days a week during the first semester. On the other three days I taught full-time at a local college. I therefore found myself committing the horrendous linguistic sin of using an occasional three-syllable word in addressing the high schoolers. In class after class, including the college prep classes, some kid – who, make no mistake, will end up in a college – would yell out, "Hey Teach, Why'n'cha speak English!" After hearing a couple of thousand of these Trustees of the Nation's Future speak – and I'm referring now only to what are called "brighter" college-bound students who know that it is necessary to endure four years of college in order to secure the union-card which enables them to keep their inherited middle-class status – and having helped hundreds write compositions, one thing I am sure of is that (again, rare exceptions), few can speak or write English with anything approaching literacy. Their vocabularies barely encompass more than Thorndike's Basic Thousand: They find phrases such as, "Like, you know, what I mean," and, "Stuff like that there," sufficient to express just about any thought on just about any subject." (I generally find that, "Like I *do* know what they mean"!) When setting their vague little concepts on paper they show not the slightest ability to organize their thoughts coherently or to differentiate between the important and unimportant in terms of place- and space-emphasis. Spelling and punctuation, of course, defy description.

This is not meant to be a "Rickover discourse" on Who Is At Fault. Max Rafferty blames it on the "antique thin-lipped spinsters who sat at the feet of John Dewey." Let me simply call your attention to a state-

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ment from what is probably the most widely used text in English pedagogy, and one to which I was subjected in order to secure my teaching license: "In teaching transition, never use the word *transition*. Instead, use *bridge*. It is probable that the average high school junior would find it extremely hard to grasp the meaning of this difficult Latin-derived word." (How true; anybody want to bet why?)

All of which brings us back to Murray Kauffman, whose success as a radio personality can be explained in terms of that number one precept of contemporary Objectivist American Morality: "He laughs all the way to the bank!"

Murray, as you'd guess, plays little but rock 'n roll. But since so many others on the air also play nothing but rock 'n roll, why does Murray the K, rather than someone else exercise this magic? Because while most other deejays restrict the message of abandoned-permissiveness to what emanates from the turntable, Murray embellishes the musical theme when he speaks. What he offers these kids in one-syllable words is Adult Approval. His speech is loaded with figures which seem to suggest approval of "kicks and force." Any record he plays which is more than two years old is "aBLAST/fromthePAST." He constantly alludes to what he terms "submarine racing" – a practice which I have yet to hear him define, but one which, according to the kids, would be at home on page 5 of *Tropic of Cancer*. (I might note that before I ever read *Tropic*, I knew all about page 5 – which is all the kids know about it. Grove Press missed a big bet in not just issuing a reprint of that one page and selling it for, say, half the price of the book. For thousands of kids, *Tropic* IS page 5.)

Last spring the station for which Murray works banned rock 'n roll. For about six weeks, no matter what school or class I was in, the conflict rocking Adolescent-dom was that, "Like, the kids, they dig Murray; and the kids, like, they dig rock 'n roll; but Murray, like, he don't play rock 'n roll no more." Within two months, however, Kauffman – whose almost fully-sponsored show makes him a power – had so successfully urged these kids to bombard the station with letters and calls protesting the dropping of rock 'n roll, that the station allowed its gradual return. Since then Murray has constantly reminded his listeners of the power they exert, the implication being that they can get whatever else they want by similar tactics. That, you see, is democracy: Numbers make Right.

I should also note that the portrait I paint is as applicable to the upper-middle-class Jews as to the slum dwelling Negroes in Brooklyn. It transcends ethnic, social and economic circumstances. In the middle-class high schools the kids are socially acute, and have conned their teachers into believing that they more or less resemble the "keen teens" of the *Archie* comics, or the sanitary napkin ads in *Seventeen* magazine. In reality, they more closely approximate, at least in outlook if not in dress and actions, the type described by the "Birch-bark" candidate in California: "booted, sideburned, ducktailed, unwashed, leather-jacketed slobs, whose favorite sport is ravaging little girls and stomping polio victims to death."

Now I doubt that these kids have ravaged as many little girls or stomped as many polio victims as Mr. Rafferty charges. But one doesn't have to be hipped on Freud to see how much these kids are concerned with death and destructiveness and kicks – *uber alles*. Why else the near-universal popularity among adolescents (who couldn't care less for Biology as a school-subject) of the morbid operating-room exploits of *Ben Casey* or *Dr. Kildare?* (I've yet to hear any kids spontaneously debate our Cuban policy; but on two recent occasions I've been afraid that an argument between two girls over the relative merits of these medicos would become a hair-pulling match.) Why the widespread popularity of the *National Enquirer* with its basic sadistic appeal? Or the box-office successes of the "teenage monster" films? And why, a couple of years back, did two rock 'n roll numbers zoom to the top of the record charts – one about a disc jock who'd dreamt he'd died and was engaged in a reverie about the post-mortem adulation he'd receive from "a million rock 'n rollers" who'd passed by his coffin as he'd lain in state; the other about a "Teen Angel" killed by a train when she ran to retrieve her boyfriend's ring from a railroad track?

Mr. Rafferty was quoted in *The New Republic* as referring to the "staggering number of young men [who] just 10 years ago sold out their fellow American soldiers and licked the boots of the brutal Chinese and North Korean invaders." This struck me with special force because of my own experiences while covering Social Studies classes in the so-called "better schools." I would try the following gambit: "How many of you believe in the Bill of Rights?" (I have to explain what the Bill of Rights is.) Almost all hands go up. Next, "How many of you believe that Communists or Nazis, such as George Lincoln Rockwell, have the right to free speech?" A few hands are timidly raised. The argument then gets going. I play devil's advocate, pointing out that if the only ones allowed to speak are those who agree with what most others accept, then Hitler's Germany and Communist Russia must be considered free countries since most of their people believed in Nazism or Communism. This approach, as you'd guess, makes little impression. I then mention that about a third of all American POW's in Korea collaborated in some way with the enemy. I further suggest that, as our discussion has indicated, while we talk of democracy and its superiority to Communism, few of us really

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understand the difference, so that in a situation where we are pressed to make a choice – as in a POW camp – we might choose to collaborate. For example, a soldier agrees to make it look like he is buying the Red line at propaganda lectures, in return for, say, an extra cigarette ration. So help me Bertrand Russell, in half of these classes, at least one kid has popped up to argue there's nothing wrong with this – " 'cause if you need a cigarette, what's so terrible about doing some little thing like that; 'cause, like, I mean, if you gotta smoke, you gotta get cigarettes some way." Whenever I put it to a vote and ask how many would make such a compromise for an extra ration of cigarettes or food, about a third of the students raise their hands.

I leave it to others (Robert Lindner?) to tell us why these kids are what they are. I've only tried to convince you that this is the situation as it exists. I do, however, find it ironic that so many who are so quick to accuse the Right of refusing to face reality, refuse to acknowledge unpleasant facts that don't fit neatly into our pat and progressive view of the world. Their ignorance leaves a vacuum which the Birchites eagerly fill.

And, like, he who plays it too cool, like, he ain't got no right to beef about why he was frozen out.

Cuba–"Long Live the Revolution!"

A Foe of Castro Counsels Against Invasion

by Javier Felipe Pazos Vea

Although this article was completed on October 18, before the presence of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba became public knowledge, it is published here in its original form because of the light it throws on the domestic problems of Cuba – problems that are likely to persist even if the Administration carries out the invasion which Mr. Pazos so urgently advises against.

Roughly two years have elapsed since Fidel Castro started to communize Cuba in earnest. Against the will of the majority of the Cuban people, Castro, as I write this, is still in power and well on his way to establishing a Communist satellite of the East European variety in the Caribbean. How has this come about? How does Castro stay in power? Is American military intervention advisable? These are the questions on which I wish to comment.

First, let me express my total disbelief in one interpretation of recent Cuban history that has gained many adherents and which Castro himself seems to be very interested in propagating at present: that Fidel was a Communist and that the revolution was a Communist conspiracy from the beginning.

The Fidel Castro I knew in the Sierra Maestra – I spent around four months as an officer on his staff during the latter part of 1957 – was definitely not a Marxist. Nor was he particularly interested in social revolution. He was, above all, a political opportunist – a man with a firm will and an extraordinary ambition. He thought in terms of winning power and keeping it. Initially, as a means of rallying anti-Batista forces to his side, he pledged to restore the liberal Constitution of 1940. However, it was always his intention to circumvent the Constitution once he had gained power. Since the Constitution had established a presidential term of four years, Castro planned to decline this office and remain instead as the power behind the presidency – the real mover of events behind a screen of puppet heads of state. The means: control of the Armed Forces, which he considered to be the ultimate source of power. This was precisely the formula by which Batista had governed from 1933 to 1940.

The other party to the alleged conspiracy, the Communists, was a negligible force at the time of the Revolution. Although a factor to be reckoned with in the '30s and '40s, the Communists had progressively lost touch with realities and had failed to win over the rising generation of politically conscious Cubans. The party cadres belonged to an older generation. Their strategy, tactics and slogans – mass struggle, popular front, etc. – had become stale and shopworn and did not appeal to the imagination of young Cubans. As late as the latter part of 1958, a few months before Castro entered Havana, the Communists were concerning themselves with the impending Batista elections, unable to perceive the genuine revolution that was taking place before

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their very eyes. They didn't participate in the Revolution because they felt it had no chance of succeeding.

The "conspiracy theory," in my opinion, has no foundation in fact. The dynamic of the Revolution was a product of events in postwar Cuba; it was not the outcome of a secret alliance between a political adventurer and a skeptical group of old-time Communists.

The Revolution essentially belonged to the generation of Cubans who came to maturity after the Second World War. In spite of the fabulous sugar earnings of the wartime period, the Island failed to broaden the base of its economy, partly due to the government's lack of vision but primarily because of corruption. Cuba's economy was stagnant or at least grew very slowly after 1948. There were upward fluctuations during the Korean War and the Suez crisis, but these did not substantially affect the pattern. The lack of opportunities for the younger generation in all walks of life was responsible for their sense of frustration.

The prevailing temper of the country demanded action to arrest the postwar drift. This frustration was channeled into the elections of 1952, in which Castro stood as a congressional candidate for the Ortodoxo Party (the main opposition party to the Prío Government in 1952). The heart of its program was the ending of corruption. Because of this, the party's slogan was "Honor versus Money." Had Batista not produced his *coup d'état*, the Ortodoxo Party would most certainly have won the elections scheduled for June of 1952. Those elections, however, never took place. Batista's *coup d'état* in March ensured that Cuba would continue to be governed by the old political system, thereby dashing to the ground the aspirations of young Cubans. Political ferment grew from that moment, and, from 1956 onward, with the consent of public opinion, the younger generation actually participated in an insurrection of which Fidel Castro – fighting in the Sierra Maestra – became the symbol and catalytic agent.

Batista – Overthrown or Collapsed

I do not wish to give the impression that the foregoing is a *sufficient* explanation of the Revolution against Batista. Nevertheless, it does go to the root of the Revolution. The main actors in the drama (always few in number) represented a cross-section of the rising generation, driven by the conviction that the old political system must be destroyed if there was ever to be material and spiritual progress in the country.

The Batista regime was weaker than expected. It did not fall through military defeat; it simply crumbled, like a termite-infested building. The utter demoralization of its high echelons made resistance to the insurrection weak and ineffective, thus assuring the Revolution's success in a relatively short period of time.

This fact had two very important consequences. On the one hand, it forestalled the emergence from the insurrection of a strong and solid group of men such as the military leader Hubert Matos and the civilian Manuel Ray – men who could have exercised a firmer control over events.

Hubert Matos was one of Castro's commanders in the Sierra Maestra. During the latter part of 1958 he directed the military siege of Santiago de Cuba, the capital of Cuba's eastern-most province, in which Guantanamo is situated. In January, 1959, he was named military commander of the province of Camaguey. An anti-Communist and a strongly independent personality, he handed in his resignation to Castro in protest against the Communist appointments to the Rebel Army which Ché Guevara and Raul Castro were making. Castro courts condemned Matos together with his closest followers in the Rebel Army to prison terms ranging from 10 to 30 years. Many other Rebel Army officers were dismissed at the time.

Manuel Ray was one of the principal leaders of the Revolution in the country. In 1959 he was named Minister of Public Works, where he demonstrated his tal-

THE AUTHOR

Born in Havana in 1936, Javier Felipe Pazos Vea *lived in exile with his family, first in the US and later in Mexico from May, 1952, to October, 1954. In the latter year he returned to Cuba and enrolled as a student in the Faculty of Law of Havana University. While at the University he participated in conspiracies against the Batista regime and in mid-'56 joined the group of leaders of the "26th of July Movement" in the province of Havana. In February, 1957, he accompanied Herbert Mathews of* The New York Times *to the Sierra Maestra Mountains where contact was made with Fidel Castro. Three months later, he helped prepare the Cienfuegos Naval uprising which occurred in September of that year. He then organized and was responsible for the transport of the arms to Castro. He finally joined the rebel forces in the mountains as an officer in July, 1957, serving first as one of Fidel Castro's Staff Officers and later under the direct command of Ché Guevara. In January, 1958, he was taken prisoner by Batista, spent the next six months in the Puerto Boniato Prison in Santiago de Cuba and was then released and came to the US as a political exile. With the triumph of the Revolution in January, 1959, he returned to Cuba, where he worked as an official of the Ministry of Economics until his final departure from the country in September, 1960. His father preceded Ché Guevara as head of the Bank of Cuba during the first months of the Castro regime. Javier Felipe Pazos Vea is at present reading Economics at Cambridge University.*

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ents as an administrator. Toward the end of 1960, seeing no other alternative but to oppose Castro and try to rescue the Revolution from the course it was taking, he founded the *Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo*, composed mainly of revolutionaries who had fought against Batista. They were able to create the only efficient underground that has operated against Castro. But the incredible incident of the Bay of Pigs permitted Castro to capture many of the leaders of this Revolutionary Movement. Later intrigues of the CIA – which was intent on dividing the anti-Castro forces so as to control them – finished the destruction of this movement. At present Manuel Ray is one of the leaders of the newly-formed Junta Revolucionaria (JURE).

The second consequence of Batista's quick collapse was that, since the outcome of the struggle seemed certain by mid-1958, all sections of Cuban society became anxious to accommodate themselves to the successful insurrectionists, which to them meant Fidel Castro. Thus, Castro enjoyed a great advantage from the beginning. He was able to approach absolute power in January, 1959, and to diminish the role of those who had fought, both in the cities and in the hills, to make the Revolution.

In the same year, Castro effectively neutralized an effort by these men to create a democratically-based revolutionary party led by Marcelo Fernandez, National Coordinator of the 26th of July Movement. In 1959, attempting to create a party out of the heterogeneous forces that fought Batista, Fernandez was one of those who led the fight against the Communists within the Revolution. This incipient party defeated the Communists in the Trade Union elections which were held during the summer of 1959.

Their newspaper *Revolucion*, engaged in polemical arguments with the Communist newspaper, *Hoy*. The idea that ours was a Humanist Revolution as against a Communist one, was expressed in the slogan, "Bread with Liberty, Liberty without Terror." All this produced a very favorable impression on the public. Yet, in order to keep power in his own hands, Castro deposed Fernandez and replaced him by a subordinate directly responsible to Castro himself. The chief function of the new National Coordinator was not to coordinate but to destroy the incipient revolutionary party. By this strategem Castro was able to undermine the democratic form of the Revolution and bend it to his own will.

These democratic forces must not be underestimated. Castro took charge of a revolution; he did not create it. The downfall of the Batista regime was the result of an insurrection that was motivated by years of accumulated frustration and it was unmistakably accompanied by the spirit to build a new Cuba.

With the overthrow of the old government, new people and a new elan rose to the surface. The traditional Armed Forces were dissolved and replaced by the Rebel Army; the Trade Union leadership, formerly held by Communists and *Mujalistas*, was taken over by David Salvador and other revolutionaries. The *Mujalistas* took their name from Eusebio Mujal Barniol, the chief of the Cuban Federation of Labor (CTC) under the governments of Grau San Martín, Prio Socarrás and Batista. During Batista's first regime the Communists, with Lázaro Peña at their head, had controlled the labor movement for him. From that time onward the Cuban Federation of Labor was the equivalent of a ministry of the government. In 1944 Grau San Martín expelled the Communists from the leadership of the CTC, and Mujal took over and controlled the movement as the Communists had before, through bribery and pistol-packing elections. David Salvador was the labor leader of the 26th of July Movement, but when Castro decided to go Communist, Salvador broke with the regime and started conspiring against it. He was caught and is now in prison.

I want to emphasize that the Rebel Army and its leaders did not have a detailed political program. The formulation of such a program took place gradually in 1959 and was the product of daily intercourse between the diverse elements that made up the Revolution.

Security

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With Batista gone, young professional men and students staffed government offices. The peasants, for the first time in Cuban history, appeared as a political force. The forward-looking sections of the middle-class rallied to the movement to build a new Cuba – which was expected to be a broadly-based society with a diversified economy. These people were the Revolution.

From them a general consensus of revolutionary goals was born. The Revolution was, above all, to be nationalistic. A sovereign, fully independent Cuba was to be established. For the first time in its history, Cuban industry was to be effectively protected against competition from the Atlantic seaboard of the United States (in the same way that many American industries are protected by tariffs from foreign competition). Our mineral resources were to revert to the nation; our public utilities were to be nationalized. An agrarian reform was to create more than 100,000 new proprietors, and urban and rural workers were to be represented by a democratic trade union movement.

The abrupt turn toward Communism was the caprice of one individual, Fidel Castro, who by design and circumstances had achieved absolute power. It is only necessary to have been in Havana in 1959, when Fidel declared the Revolution to be "Olive Green" and not "Red," as Cuban as the *palmas reales*, and to have observed the enthusiasm which this declaration aroused among the public and the revolutionaries, in order to learn the true feeling in the country. Castro did not follow the will of Cuba; he acted against it.

Why? In my opinion, the Communists, having studied Freud as well as Marx, convinced Fidel that Cuba was too small a stage for a leader of his caliber – that he must exercise his formidable talents against the larger back-drop of Latin America. They would provide an organization and the support of a World Power in this venture. Secondly, Communism required a radical transformation of Cuba, a transformation so radical as to justify dictatorship, if not of the proletariat then at least of Fidel Castro, the Latin American Lenin.

Why Castro Still Survives

There is no doubt that Castro has found among his lieutenants some enthusiastic collaborators, such as Ché Guevara, Ramiro Valdes and his brother Raul.

But the great majority of participants in the Communization of Cuba (both in high and low positions) have never been Communists. In addition, many of the early enthusiasts became disenchanted when confronted by the brutal political and economic facts of Communist Cuba. Three fundamental factors have, however, enabled Castro to carry both non-Communists and anti-Communists with him since mid-1960.

First, the opposition to Castro has been of a counter-revolutionary nature. (The tone of this opposition has always been set by right-wing elements with access to financial resources which have been denied to the liberal-minded exiles.) It is important to stress that there exists among revolutionaries in Cuba, mostly non-Communists, a natural instinct to preserve that which they have helped to create: The Revolution. The Revolution is their *raison d'être* and even if it takes a course distasteful to them, they would rather wait and eventually try to make their point of view prevail than break with the Revolution and go over to the opposing camp. Also, with counter-revolution as the only alternative, defections in the lower echelons of the regime – so important since they form the Militia and the politically-vital neighborhood Vigilance Committees – have never really been likely. These cadres, made up for the most part of the lower ranks of Cuban society, have won a dignity through the Revolution which they had never possessed before. This spiritual condition is, in many instances, far more important to them than immediate material satisfaction. It may well explain why they remain loyal to Castro, even if they are discontented with a system of government which has reduced the standard of living.

Secondly, since the image of this opposition to Fidel has been an American one with Cubans appearing to participate in a subordinate capacity, rather than the other way round as it should be, Castro has been able to appeal to the nationalistic sentiment of the Cubans. The appearance of the counter-revolution as a US affair was not altogether a false one, since certain elements in the United States began to support, as early as 1959, Cubans who were opposed not only to Communism but to the Revolution as such. The Cuban mind was not slow to identify all opposition to the regime as American-inspired and counter-revolutionary – playing directly into Fidel Castro's hands. Thus, although defections began to appear after the turn to Communism, the defectors failed to coalesce into a movement strong enough to overthrow Castro because of the widespread fear that if Castro fell the Revolution would fall with him. The objective confirmation of this, incessantly fostered by Castro, came with the incredible incident of the Bay of Pigs, a joint venture of the Central Intelligence Agency and the most reactionary of Cuban leaders-in-exile. This débâcle only served to consolidate Castro's hold, since the appeal to nationalism had always been his most effective weapon.

The third factor is an historical one. The Cuban people have suffered many previous frustrations and have consistently seen their efforts go unrewarded. Such a history is attended by skepticism. It is essential to restore the faith of Cubans in their destiny by presenting a positive program for the future before expecting them to rise against Communism.

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Given the fact that Castro's best ally has been the kind of opposition with which he has been confronted up to the present, we must again raise the last of the questions which I posed at the beginning of this article: Is American military intervention advisable?

I feel it would be a disaster. It would be tragic if the West could find no other alternative to Communism in Cuba than an invasion by American forces. The overthrow of Communism by internal revolutionary forces is a far better solution both for the West and for the Cubans. And to the Cubans it represents the only possibility of continuing the course which they set for themselves in 1959.

The prospects for an internal uprising are better at this time than ever before. Castro's charisma is definitely fading; the economic situation has continued to deteriorate and shows no sign of amelioration; and, above all, the recent appearance of so many Russians in the island will undoubtedly stimulate Cuba's highly-developed sense of nationalism and evoke a revulsion of feeling against Castro and the Communists. Given these circumstances, *the tons of armaments which the Russians have sent to Cuba are more than sufficient to overthrow Communism.* To take advantage of the present favorable situation, the non-Communist but progressive elements in the regime must be reached and must be convinced that their Revolution would not be endangered if Castro and the Communists are ousted. The alternative to Communism must be a Cuba motivated by the ideals which prompted the Revolution in the first place. Also, Cubans must be exalted by the conviction that the overthrow of Communism will mean a genuinely independent Cuba. A program reaffirming the initial phase of the Revolution must be launched. That program is Cuba Si, Revolucion Si, Comunismo No.

Report from the "Red Riviera"–II

Khrushchev, Gomulka and Their Critics

by Philip Ben

Among the questions I asked the Communist officials, the intellectuals, the professional people who were vacationing under the warm sun on the sandy Bulgarian beach last August, rumors about the opposition to Nikita Khrushchev inside his own Soviet Party had top priority.

Realizing how delicate this question is, I put it to only a few top people. Some were old acquaintances, others I succeeded in getting to know by playing the Polish version of bridge, or talking long evenings around a bottle of Slivovitz or good Bulgarian wine. It was obvious that this problem of opposition to Khrushchev's role concerned them deeply and that they were discussing it frequently among themselves.

But they were surprised that I asked about "internal opposition." With great unanimity they replied: "Certainly there is opposition inside the Soviet party apparatus, but this isn't the root of the problem. What counts most is the opposition which various aspects of Khrushchev's policy are encountering among leaders of several satellite countries. It may seem unbelievable to you and to people in the West generally, but nowadays the biggest foes of Nikita Khrushchev are people known for their long and unconditional obedience to the Kremlin – Georgu Dej of Rumania, Zivkov of Bulgaria, Novotny of Czechoslovakia."

Why this opposition? Because, I was told, those satellite leaders mistrust Khrushchev's policy of liberalization. Their poor intellectual background prevents their grasping its necessity. They fear that to apply liberalization in their own countries would mean losing control of the masses and of the intellectuals, about whose hostility to the Communist regime they have no illusion. The Rumanian, Bulgarian and Czech leaders believe, and say in closed Communist councils, that should they follow Khrushchev's example their countries would soon become theaters for dramas similar to that which took place in Budapest in 1956.

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There is still another reason for this feud between the Soviet Premier and the Czech, Rumanian and Bulgarian leaders. This is the perennial agricultural crisis from which all the Communist countries suffer and which lately has hit those three satellites especially hard. According to my informants a very ugly quarrel took place during the gathering of all Communist leaders who came to Moscow last October for the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. At one of the secret meetings Khrushchev made an all-out attack on agricultural conditions in his satellites. He was reported to have said: "Comrades, you appeal almost every day to me and ask for wheat and other foodstuffs. But I don't have them. Besides, I can't understand why you shouldn't be able to harvest enough grain or have your own money and buy what you need. I can't see why you didn't profit from our experience. When we collectivized the land, it was a big experiment. We paid an enormous price. I can't say that it was a success. But for us it is too late to go back. But you have seen our example. Why didn't you go slow on collectivization? Look at Comrade Gomulka! You know what he did to his *kolkhozes*. And now he has enough bread. He doesn't bother me constantly about it." At least, so it was reported to me.

According to my informers, these words provoked vehement indignation in the meeting hall. Georgu Dej of Rumania sprang up to his feet and, interrupting Khrushchev, shouted: "In whose name are you speaking? Are you still a Marxist-Leninist or a liquidator of Marxism?" When the uproar quieted down the Czech, the Bulgar, the Rumanian, one after another, took the floor and in long speeches refuted Khrushchev's attacks. If they collectivized their agriculture, it was because they were following Soviet example and Soviet advice. Besides, a Communist regime could not exist along with private holding of land. Anyhow, collectivization was now a fact and they needed from "the Soviet brothers" not critical remarks but help.

Not all the satellite leaders spoke against Khrushchev, but few of them came out in his defense. The most prominent among them was Gomulka. In 1956 the Soviet leader had cried out to Gomulka at the Warsaw airfield: "You want to sell to the Americans and the Zionists this land which we liberated with our blood." But now that hatchet has been buried. Since 1960, when Gomulka supported Khrushchev against the Chinese, Poland has been the darling of the Kremlin, and Gomulka has become not only Khrushchev's number one ally, but also his personal friend. In recent years there has been hardly any gathering of Communist leaders at which Khrushchev did not make a long speech praising Gomulka's economic, cultural and foreign policy. Communist bosses have been surprised to hear the master of the Kremlin praising the shrewdness of the Poles who know how to get American aid without making the slightest concession "to the imperialists." And this praise has always been coupled with encouragement to follow the Polish example if they can. Another ally of Khrushchev nowadays is Janos Kadar of Hungary, who is both a believer in internal liberalization and in a go-slow policy toward the Hungarian peasants, many of whom still own their own land.

Thus inside the Communist camp two hostile forces face each other: Khrushchev-Gomulka-Kadar against Georgu Dej-Zivkov-Novotny. According to my sources the visit which Khrushchev paid last spring to Rumania and Bulgaria was motivated by the desire to end this feud, at least symbolically. His effort to persuade those two countries to improve their relations with Tito was only a secondary aim. However, the visit did not settle anything and the feud continues.

I must confess that it was difficult for me to swallow those revelations, I could hardly imagine Georgu Dej shouting at Khrushchev. But my informers were not shaken by my doubts. They explained that this was a clear indication of how conditions have changed since Stalin's time.

Whenever my informers were talking about the Bucarest-Sofia-Prague axis, I tried to ascertain whether this opposition to Khrushchev is in touch with Peking. The question produced only ironic laughter and was taken as a typical example of how little the West understands what is going on in the Communist world. Their answer was that for all practical purposes Communist China is out of the Soviet camp and nobody inside it counts on Peking. Anyhow, the Chinese have turned all their attention to the Far East, Africa and Latin America. And this reply was coupled with a warning not to misunderstand the nature of the opposition by Georgu Dej, Zivkov, Novotny: They are asking for nothing more than to be able to serve Moscow as faithfully and as obediently as they have in the past. They only want Moscow not to cut the weak branch on which they sit.

I also tried to ascertain where the East German boss, Ulbricht, stands in this dispute. The reply was that of course his heart is with the anti-Khrushchev opposition, but that his position is too precarious to allow him to criticize the master of the Kremlin.

The New Poland

The great increase in Poland's prestige inside the Soviet bloc is fascinating. A country which only a few years ago was considered in every Communist capital as Typhoid Mary carrying the epidemic of revisionism is now highly respected and even envied. The envy is caused by the amount of freedom which Polish citizens have, by the multiple relations which Poles maintain

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with the West, by the fact that they alone among all Soviet bloc nations know how to get American aid, and finally, because Poland is now the only Communist country (with the exception of Hungary) without serious food shortages.

I am not suggesting that Poland has become prosperous and stabilized. My Polish friends were extremely bitter and pessimistic. There is steadily increasing tension between the regime on one side, and the intellectuals and professional people on the other. These classes have grown considerably in number as well as in stature. Nowhere in the world does one find so many people as in Warsaw who are aware of the latest cultural, scientific, economic and political trends, both in the US, France, Britain, and in Russia and Communist China. Poland today has many extremely able painters, architects, designers, engineers, economists, movie producers. And these highly valued citizens constantly feel hampered and paralyzed by the unintelligent, ignorant party bureaucrats.

The era when even the most bitter foes of Communism in Poland hesitated to criticize Gomulka is over. True, everybody still recognizes that he is a Polish patriot and not a Soviet stooge, and that inside Poland it is he who decides and not Moscow. But the Polish intellectuals and professionals describe Gomulka as a man of very limited horizons, not knowing the outside world and very old fashioned. "He is the only man in Poland who still believes in Communism" was the remark heard many times.

Another reason for the political uneasiness prevailing in Poland is a new struggle inside the Polish Communist Politburo and the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers Party. One should remember the bitter struggle which in 1956 preceded Gomulka's return to power. This struggle was fought against a Stalinist *Natolin* group which wanted to preserve Moscow's hold on Poland. Gomulka emerged victorious from that struggle because several middle-of-the-road factions in the Polish Politburo broke with Moscow and sided with him. One of those factions, often called liberal, was led by the Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz and the foreign minister Rapacki, both former Socialists. Another consisted mostly of old Polish Communists who had spent the war years in Russia, and who, though formerly obedient Stalinists, at the bottom of their heart remained Poles. This faction was led by Edouard Ochab, who was Gomulka's predecessor as secretary general of the Polish Communist Party, and by Roman Zambrowski, whose special distinction is that he is the only Jew left in the ruling Politburo in any of the Communist countries.

After Gomulka's victory in autumn 1956, Polish factionalism came to a standstill. The subsequent reconciliation with the Kremlin strengthened Gomulka

R. I. P.

so much that even the most extreme Stalinists did not dare defy him. But at the end of 1959 the situation changed. The defection to the West of Colonel Pawel Monat, one of the top figures of the Polish military intelligence, was a terrible blow to Gomulka's prestige. Though Moscow intervenes very little – or not at all – in the day-to-day affairs of other Communist states, there are a few exceptions to this rule. Internal security, counter-intelligence and spying belong in this category. There is a large degree of collaboration between the intelligence branches of the Soviet state machine and those of the satellite countries. This is especially true of the Polish services, since the Poles are universally considered especially capable in this kind of activity.

Colonel Monat knew many Soviet secrets which he no doubt told the Americans after his defection. No wonder that soon afterward heavy Soviet pressure was put on Gomulka. Moscow demanded a drastic overhaul of all Polish security services and insisted that men Moscow could trust be placed at the top. Moscow's choice was nobody else but General Witaszewski, an old Soviet agent inside the Polish Communist Party, who only three years earlier had led the struggle against Gomulka. Feeling his position greatly compromised owing to Monat's defection, Gomulka agreed to Witaszewski's appointment.

The new boss of the Polish security service there-

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upon started a purge. It consisted of introducing into those services in Poland the Soviet principle that the Jews, because of their international connections and their longings abroad, are *ipso facto* "security risks" and, with rare exceptions, should be excluded from all "sensitive state services." The fact that Monat was of Jewish origin (and so were many other defectors in recent years in Poland) provided an additional justification for the anti-Jewish purge. As soon as it had been accomplished in the security apparatus, Witaszewski wanted to extend it to other branches of government.

But here he encountered vigorous opposition in the Polish Politburo. Premier Cyrankiewicz, foreign minister Rapacki, Ochab, Zambrowski, argued that such a purge would be a return to the worst practices of the Stalinist era. Gomulka, no anti-Semite himself and married to a Jewess, supported them. No extensive anti-Jewish purge took place. However, at the beginning of 1960 the lists were drawn up and kept ready of all persons of Jewish origin occupying positions in various important branches of the administration.

During the past year, demands for a drastic purge and stricter security rules have again been heard. One reason is that the Polish intellectuals who had kept quiet following Gomulka's retreat from the freedom slogans of the "Polish October" were encouraged by the anti-Stalin drive which took place at the 22nd Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow. They started demanding more and more freedom, and this alarmed men around Witaszewski. His allies grew quite powerful.

Most of these allies belonged to the so-called "Partisans" – that is, people who during the war fought in the ranks of the very small Communist anti-German underground in Poland. When the war ended most of them rapidly advanced in the ranks of the Polish security service. But with Gomulka's downfall in 1949 all the Communists who spent the war years in Poland became suspect. Some lost their jobs, others went to prison, from which they were released only after Gomulka's return to power. The most colorful figure among the Partisans seems to be General Korczynski, now head of military intelligence. Korczynski fought in the International Brigade in Spain and in the Communist underground in France. Later he came to occupied Poland through Germany in order to lead a detachment of anti-Nazi Communist guerrillas. But strangely enough, he coupled this fight against Hitler with extremely anti-Jewish feelings. On many occasions he personally executed Jews, including members of his units whose Jewish origin was discovered.

In 1943 he got in touch with a group of Jewish Partisans who had fled from Nazi concentration camps and were hiding in forests near Lublin. Those Jews wanted arms and Korczynski promised to sell them for payment in dollars. Instead of giving them arms, however, he ordered his troops to wipe them out. Some 50 people including women and children were massacred.

In 1949 when the Stalinists were looking for arguments against Gomulka, Korczynski was arrested in hope that he would say it was Gomulka who ordered the liquidation of the Jewish Partisans. But Korczynski refused to make this false testimony. Subsequently he was sentenced to life imprisonment which was later commuted to 15 years. Released shortly after Gomulka returned to power, Korczynski was soon given important posts. Another member of the Partisans, Mieczyslaw Moczar, was appointed deputy minister of internal affairs, and Roman Strzelecki became a party secretary in charge of organizational matters.

Anti-Semitism and Anti-Intellectualism

The ideological link between the Partisans and old-Stalinists like Witaszewski seems to be a common anti-Jewish feeling, hatred of the liberal intellectuals and a longing for the "old good times" when all power was in hands of the security apparatus. Strangely enough, all this is combined with a very pronounced anti-Soviet attitude and with strong Polish nationalism. The Partisans are especially critical of Khrushchev's policy of liberalization which they consider a major calamity for the entire world Communist movement.

Seeing that the intellectuals were again raising their heads, the Partisans decided to act. Their first aim seems to be to complete the anti-Jewish purge. Their more distant targets are the "liberals" of the Politburo – Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki and Ochab. During recent months, Warsaw has been full of rumors in connection with intrigues which the partisans started in order to compromise their top enemies, including Cyrankiewicz himself. One of those intrigues led to the dismissal of one of the most powerful men in the Polish security apparatus, and apparently the only Jew still left there, Henryk Alster, a deputy minister of interior. This dismissal was considered by many as indicating that the dormant list of Jews in important positions has again been taken out of the files and that the purge could not be much longer delayed.

No wonder there is uneasiness in Poland. Important developments may take place when the Polish Central Committee meets sometime this fall. Everything may again depend on Gomulka. He certainly does not share the Partisans' strange ideology and may be unaware of many of their doings. But he is linked with them by a common and unforgettable past. He also needs them at present, having little confidence in his immediate collaborators. And there is no doubt that the Partisans want to exploit this need and grab as much power as they can in preparation for the day Gomulka goes.

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Getting to the Bottom of the Top

by Hilary Corke

It is unambiguously a sequel to *Room at the Top*, so it will be best to consider the two books together. *Room at the Top* (as if you didn't know) was about Joe Lampton, poor working-class, orphaned, ambitious, determined at whatever cost to escape out of the world of slums and sweat and soot into that of refrigerators and tiled bathrooms and what the advertisers call "gracious living." He has two assets – besides his determination: he is a lady-killer, and he is bright and the state has given him a good education. The education has procured him a post in local government, and the book opens with his arrival at Warley, a small prosperous township of the English industrial north, that is full of just the sort of living that he wants. And the male charm, once he has joined the amateur dramatic society, passport to local social mobility, brings him into fruitful contact with the wives and daughters of the rich.

Life at the Top
by John Braine
(Houghton Mifflin; $4.50)

Of these, two become important. Alice Aisgill, wife of a middlingly successful businessman, is ten years older than Joe, but they fall passionately in love. Susan Brown, on the other hand, is the daughter of the uncrowned king of Warley, eighteen, as pretty as you like and as innocent as they come. Joe doesn't love her, but he manages to make her love him. He gets her pregnant. Father says "All right, better marry her," Joe chucks Alice, who kills herself in her car, and there he is at the Top of his dreams, but having destroyed all that is really valuable in himself to get there.

End of Morality Number One – and a very satisfactory end for such a thing, Joe in the midst of the back-slaps and felicitations, feeling nothing but the terrible aching hollow at his heart. A future of successful misery lies before him, and the reader needs no details. However, Mr. Braine does not want to leave it happily there, and Morality Number Two gives us the details after all. *Life at the Top* shows Joe ten years on. His financial success has been moderate: he has the longed-for house and gadgets, but he is not a trusted director of Brown & Co., or anything like it. His father-in-law employs him and pays him well, but he has no kind of authority or freedom of action. He has a son and daughter, and loves the daughter. He does not love Susan, and he never has loved her; but he is fond of her in his selfish way and has never, for the little it is worth, been technically unfaithful to her in the flesh, though his mind has remained as footloose as ever.

No, the unfaithfulness, when it comes, is from Susan; and a mighty surprise to Joe Lampton it is. Susan, aware (as any woman must become) that she is not really loved, turns into an intolerable nagger and is finally caught by him in red-handed adultery. The bust-up, Joe's immediate revenge with the current woman of his mind, the eventual reconcilation, the willing agreement to make a fresh, humbler and more truthful start, form the main substance of the book.

Mr. Braine is not a peculiarly gifted writer. He has many virtues, he is a good competent novelist, he shows an engaging urge toward honesty of vision, he has a clear and workmanlike style; but he does not display the quality of understanding, either of individual motivations, or the way the social world is put together, or of the nature of creative language, that would place him in any first class. He is a good craftsman, among many equals. What we have to ask is why *Room at the Top* should have enjoyed such signal success; and whether its sequel is likely to do the same.

In the first place, the *theme* of *Room at the Top* was exactly right for its moment – bestsellerwise, that is to say. England is full of Joe Lamptons, Jimmy Porters, Luck Jims. "Angry young men" is not really the best name for them or for their creators: they are uprooted young men, they are lost, before they are angry. The Welfare State now confers what used to be "a gentleman's education" upon all of the sons and daughters of the poorer classes who show more intelligence than quite a dimmish average – not, as formerly, only upon the most brilliant. These young people emerge into the world with moderate learning, moder-

P.M.S. Blackett

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ate intelligence and immoderate ambition. What they need, in addition, to satisfy the last is, of course, *connections*. Children of the richer classes, no brighter or better educated, have uncles, wealthy schoolfriends, father's business pals. They get ahead.

The Lamptons, on the other hand, have to *make* their connections; and that is one of the first things that John Braine's books are about. They are the narrative equivalents of the current sociological treatises upon "the meritocracy" or "organization man." This is timely. It is also timely that they appear (though it *is* only an appearance) to cut through one of the standard English hypocrisies – the hypocrisy over money. Before the war no English novelist ever did anything so vulgar as to mention a sum of pounds shillings and pence. He took refuge in evasions of the type of "a very large sum," "of moderate means," "a miserable pittance." Now we know that Joe's house cost £4,500 and that the inventory of its contents amounted to £2,700. And, most important of all, Braine states quite clearly Lampton's belief – which is, to every appearance, his own – that money, and efficient plumbing and motorcars are good in their own right, quite irrespective of the quality of mind and sensitivity of experience that one brought to them. Quite a large factor in Joe's determination to leave his new mistress is the antiquity of her geyser and dilapidation of her bath. His whole attitude, in fact, toward the appurtenances for which he sacrifices his love and freedom, is that naïve one of the typical poor, who always prefer to give £40 for a new and shoddy plywood chest-of-drawers, rather than £20 for a piece of solid Georgian mahogany.

The whole dynamic of the books indeed rests upon two "truths" and their opposition – which we may call "matinee truths" and "matinee false opposition," because they are just the sort of thing that keeps the phony drama alive. One, that it really is, actually, better to be rich than poor. Two: that one can pay too big a price for it. These revelations absolutely knock them in the teacupped aisles. The impact is clinched by scare after scare that is purest cliché – the stern forbidding father-figure (Mr. Brown) who offers you money to leave his daughter alone, then slaps you on the back when you refuse to take it – unsurprise after unsurprise that keeps the whole house hushed. A million copies sold.

One must add, for it largely undermines the whole "social-theory" structure of the two books, that Mr. Braine has a remarkably unreal and immature conception of what really constitutes "the top." Business-success in a small northern town, apparently. Or, if one likes, simply business-success: the bigger your salary, the more "top" you have got. But, even on the most materialistic lines, there are other and "better" tops than that. There is power as well as money, and the two don't anywhere near wholly overlap. There are the professions, which in the Braine world, appear simply not to exist. A bishop, we must suppose, or a Vice Chancellor or a Harley Street surgeon, are also at the top. And, even financially, there is better money than business-money. There is money from inheritance and land. (I speak, naturally, in terms not my own. And I have also no space in which to argue how far the Braine and Lampton views of the world are to be identified or not.)

But, when all the easy demolition is done, there still remains something solid and human at the core. It may not be very distinguished, but at least it is felt and real. The plentiful "strong" sex passages are not so much created as day-dreamt, but at least they are roughly the right dreams and remind one, in more ways than in their setting, of the early D. H. Lawrence – in both cases, too, the forceful and compulsive nature of the man-woman relationships, is founded on a deep basis of pure prudery (see the key scene in *Room at the Top* when Joe learns that Alice once posed nude). The social morality may be naive and crude, but at least it is memorably presented and comes down on the right side. And *Room at the Top* was also a first novel, with all and more than all the freshness that implies. It was a bright and early morning book, and its author was obviously a very nice young man.

Now, it is noon and the dew is off. *Life at the Top* is very much "the mixture as before," perhaps a little better, perhaps a little worse. But, necessarily, it is not news. That is quite enough about Joe Lampton now.

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A Royal Headache

by Elizabeth Monroe

Ten years ago, there were six thrones in the Middle East; today there are three. Statistically, therefore, the title of this book is apposite; it is also poignant, for neither the Shah of Iran, nor King Saud of Arabia nor Jordan's King Hussein can be sure that their crowns will not tumble too – knocked off in the course of the wavering march towards socialism on which the Middle East is

Uneasy Lies the Head
by King Hussein of Jordan
(Geis; $4.95)

bent today. Likewise ten years ago, if an insurance agent had been asked to quote a premium for crowns, he would have named top price for Jordan's. For the country was beset with disasters; it was in the first place an artificial creation, conjured out of nothing by the British in 1920 in order to provide a patrimony for one of the sons of the Sharif of Mecca who had fought with them in the first world war; it was poor to the point of indigence; it had just, after losing the Palestine war, increased its poverty by adding to itself the Arab remnant of Palestine; its king Abdullah – Hussein's grandfather – had thereupon been murdered by disgruntled Palestinians; his son, the new King Talal, was prone to hopeless nervous collapses, and almost two-thirds of the population consisted of victims of the Palestine war, who regarded kings as a survival of desert life, and out of date. The scene was worthy of Euripides.

Yet the kingdom survives, and this book helps to explain the extent to which its survival is due to the character and work of one young man. By force of disastrous circumstances, Hussein was brought while still in his teens to realize the extent to which assured demeanor kindles a spark of hope and respect in flagging mankind. Nature made him small of stature, but endowed him with a ringing voice and plenty of courage, moral as well as physical. He has tackled with equal aplomb army revolts, near-Communist prime ministers, shattered windscreens, air attack by Arab opponents flying MIGs, poison inserted into the bottle in which he keeps his remedy for sinus. Yet his book, though most spirited, is a sad one, for it brings home the immense loneliness of monarchy in a world in which hereditary rule has earned itself a bad name. King Farouk making a pet of his Italian barber, Saudi princelings squandering a nation's income outside their country, the Imam of Yemen shut away in an inapprochable palace have between them handicapped workaday kings beyond imagining. Yet in spite of this drawback, and of the special difficulty of running needy Jordan, Hussein has inched his way into favor with a once surly people. The secrets of his success are eagerness to learn what ordinary people think (sometimes, he drives a taxi), hard work, and simplicity. He has offered his people a mixture of bravery, comradeship and service that has won their grudging respect.

As a political record, his tale leaves something to be desired. Naturally, a book for readers ranging from inquisitive Westerners to hostile Egyptians and nervy Ex-Palestinians is bound to gloss over some matters. But here and there reticence has gone too far. For instance, a chapter on Jordan's economy speaks only of spending, and scarcely at all of where the money comes from. In fact, Jordan has never so far been able to make ends meet without a large subsidy from abroad. Originally, this was provided by Britain in return for bases and training grounds; when nationalism rendered this arrangement impossible, Arab neighbors promised the necessary funds, but never paid up; today, the United States government has offered his people a mixture of it necessary to be so uninformative about the Suez crisis? At that time, Britain subjected its then allies, Iraq and Jordan, to laceration by conflicting emotions – sympathy for victims of attack by Israel, fear of gain for the Soviets, perplexity about British policy. Hussein's description of the dilemma into which he was plunged would have been of the greatest interest. Instead, Suez is dismissed as a "wrangle." On

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the other hand, the book contains some details not elsewhere available, such as evidence of Jordan's warnings to an over-complacent Nuri Pasha before the Iraqi revolution of 1958, and an assessment of the shortcomings of Iraq's former regent, Abdulillah as a man who held on to power for too long.

Few write their memoirs at 27, and this is in many ways a young man's book. ("I tore the old Dove round in a turn.") Yet it is the work of a man tempered by overmuch worry, danger and grief. A zenith of understatement occurs at the beginning of a final chapter called "My Courtship and Marriage" when he remarks that his personal life, while empty, had "not, after all, been the life of an ordinary young man." In the last pages, he finds happiness in marriage to an English girl. In view of the political implications that always attend royal marriages, not to mention the disadvantage of a link with Britain in the eyes of most Arab nationalists, the acceptance that his private life has won from his people is a tribute to his character.

Two Books, One Plot

by Robert Evett

Fail-Safe, a new novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, is a Book of the Month Club selection for October. It is thus guaranteed a wide circulation even if it gets a bad press (and so far, it has had a good press); it is likely to be one of the best sellers of the season.

Fail-Safe, according to the publishers, grew out of a story of Mr. Wheeler's called "The Sacrifice of Abraham," I have not been able to find this story, which is not listed in *The Readers Guide to Periodical Literature*, but it is said to have appeared in 1958. 1958 was the year in which Peter Bryant produced his novel *Red Alert*, (Ace Books; 35 cents) which like *Fail-Safe* tells an exciting story. In both novels, a group of American bombers is making a routine flight in the Arctic. The run involves going to the "fail safe" point, beyond which there is a chance of provoking the Soviet Union to war. The fliers (by mistake) receive and execute orders to attack. The President agrees to sacrifice a US city as an act of reparation.

Here is how the two books independently develop the plot:

Red Alert (1958)	*Fail Safe* (1962)
1. A routine flight out of Sonora, Texas, reaches the fail-safe line.	1. A routine flight out of Omaha reaches the fail-safe line.
2. A sick general cracks up and orders the flight to attack targets within the USSR.	2. A machine in Omaha breaks down and sends out an attack order by mistake.
3. The President sends US troops to take the Texas base and the berserk general.	3. The President orders US fighter planes to shoot down the bombers before they reach the target.
4. The President calls the head of the Soviet government to explain that the attack is a mistake.	4. The President calls the head of the Soviet government to explain that the attack is a mistake.
5. One bomber gets through the Soviet defenses and heads for the city of Kotlass.	5. Two bombers get through the Soviet defenses and head for Moscow.
6. The Soviet dictator demands the sacrifice of an American city (Atlantic City) in exchange for Kotlass.	6. The President offers to blow up New York in exchange for Moscow.
7. The bomber misses the target; the bomb explodes in an unpopulated area.	7. The bomb wipes out Moscow.
8. The President learns that Kotlass was spared, forces the Soviets to abandon their plan of bombing Atlantic City.	8. The President has the city of New York and its entire population wiped out.

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Nuclear War by Accident

by Jack Wilson

This is a novel about a nuclear attack, launched by accident and in spite of the efforts of the President of the US and the Chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR, working in concert. It describes, in the words of the publisher, "a dilemma that must haunt us every day of our lives." As the authors put it in their preface: "The accident may not occur in the way we describe but the laws of probability assure us that ultimately it will occur."

Fail-Safe
by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler
(McGraw-Hill; $4.95)

We are thus put on notice that this is not an ordinary novel. It's intended to stir us up, to give us something new to worry about, to inspire questions in Congress, and to arouse the editorial writers. Burdick, on the record, is adept at this sort of writing. He and William Lederer did it expertly in *The Ugly American* and, with Wheeler, he has done an equally slick and competent job in *Fail-Safe*. It is an exciting story. The characters may be wooden, but the wood is nicely polished.

But do Burdick and Wheeler know what they are writing about? Their title refers to the fail-safe system used by the Strategic Air Command to forestall an accidental attack. When an unidentified aircraft appears on SAC's radar system scopes it is routine for heavy bombers to be alerted for possible take-off. If the mysterious aircraft, the bogey, is not quickly identified the bombers are launched, fully armed, with sealed target orders. When they reach their control points, areas near the borders of the Soviet Union but still well outside, they turn around and fly home unless they receive positive nizes that there may be a breakdown in communications with the bombers. It is so designed that if it fails, it fails on the safe side.

All of the important details of this system are, of course, secret. A competent technician might guess at some of them, on the basis of what has been orders to go ahead. The system recog- made public. He might, on the same basis, speculate about the possibility that something could go wrong. Burdick and Wheeler make it plain that they had access only to unclassified material, the implication being that they have minutely examined the tip of the iceberg and have made some pretty shrewd deductions about the rest of it. Their book, however, seems to demonstrate that they either didn't study, or didn't absorb, even the unclassified material.

For example: Their description of the underground control center (the book calls it the War Room) at SAC headquarters near Omaha is detailed and interesting and largely wrong. It is not hard to get into the control center and to learn a good deal about its workings, but there is no evidence that the authors have done so, even though much of the action of the novel takes place there. They describe it as a place of mystery and shadows, 400 feet underground, heavily shielded with lead and concrete. Actually the structure, which SAC people refer to as The Underground, is only 45 feet below the surface and is so lightly reinforced that it offers about the same protection as a good fallout shelter in a home basement. It's a large, well-lighted room, as mysterious as a supermarket.

When the fail-safe system broke down, as Burdick and Wheeler describe the proceedings, a "global system of missiles" is alerted for action, along with the heavy bombers. Some of the missiles, presumably intercontinental rockets, are said to use "stars and planets to position themselves, constantly making small alterations in direction while moving at a speed of 20,000 miles an hour." It isn't easy to decide exactly what the authors think they are talking about here. A missile that traveled at 20,000 miles an hour would go into orbit, the laws of Kepler and Newton being what they are. An ICBM travels about 15,000 miles an hour. And it does not guide itself by the stars and constantly make small alterations in direction. During the first few minutes, while the engines are burning, it is directed by radio or by an inertial system of gyroscopes and accelerometers. After engine burnout it flies on a fixed trajectory, like a bullet.

Three times, twice in one paragraph, the book refers to the "confirmation" of the unidentified airplane that started all the trouble. One error might be a misprint. Three can only lead to speculation that the writers must have heard someone mention "conformation" but hadn't quite understood. It probably was not anyone associated with the fail-safe system. The Air Force uses the term "configuration." Then there is the amazing sentence: "The Minute Man and Polaris, which used solid fuel, began the elaborate countdown which had been done hundreds of times be-

Notes on Contributors

Hilary Corke *is a young British poet and critic.* Elizabeth Monroe *has written extensively about the Middle East.* Jack Wilson *is a Washington newspaperman who covers the Pentagon.*



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
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
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-HEH HEH-ESTABLISHMENT.

WE MAKE OUR STAND, INTRODUCE A BILL MILDER THAN THE STAND WE HAVE TAKEN, MAKE A DEAL TO WATER IT DOWN WITH AMENDMENTS IN ORDER TO GET ANOTHER WATERED DOWN BILL WE WANT OUT OF COMMITTEE-
I SEE- I SEE-

THIS GIVES US AN ISSUE TO CAMPAIGN ON WHILE FREEING US FROM HAVING TO IMPLEMENT A MEANINGLESS BILL WHICH WOULD HAVE COST US CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON FUTURE MEASURES THAT WE MIGHT FEEL EQUALLY STRONG ABOUT!
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
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fore." Both missiles have been widely publicized as instant reaction weapons which require no countdown. In another section the pilots of a squadron of fighter airplanes talk to one another in flight, discussing their speed in terms of miles per hour. Air Force fliers invariably measure speed in knots.

None of these, or the other assorted boners in the book, would be worth noting except for the fact that the authors ask us to believe that they know enough about the machinery of war and the fail-safe system to point out their weaknesses. We are asked to believe, on the word of writers who evidently haven't done their homework, that the world is at the mercy of a system so carelessly designed and operated that it can reverse itself without being detected, and set off an attack by saying yes when it means no.

We are giving the men in the Pentagon $50 billion a year to spend on such contraptions. If Burdick and Wheeler are right in their analysis of the possibilities, we should ask for our $50 billion back.

THEATER

Albee and the Medusa-Head

Edward Albee's new work embodies both the failings and the virtues of his previous plays. But its positive achievements are substantial, and I am finally beginning to regard this playwright's future with real expecttaion. Albee's technical dexterity has always been breathtaking – for sheer theatrical skill, no American, not even Williams, can match him – but like Williams, he has been inclined to falsify his native gifts, distorting experience through self-defensive reflecting mirrors. In *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf*, Albee is still not looking the Gorgon smack in the eye. Still, he has conjured up its outline. And if he tends to focus more on writhing snakes than on the other features of this terrifying monster, then even these quick glances are more penetrating than I have come to expect; and they are always projected in steaming, raging, phantasmagoric theatrical images.

Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf
by Edward Albee
(Billy Rose)

Virginia Woolf is an ambitious play, and it evokes the shades of the most ambitious dramatists. The central conflict – a Strindbergian battle royal between George, a contemplative History professor with an unsuccessful career, and Martha, his bitterly shrewish wife – proceeds through a series of confessions, revelations, and interior journeys which recall the circuitous windings of O'Neil's late plays. Glued together by mutual hatred and mutual recriminations, the couple can connect only through enmity, each exposing the other's failures, inadequacies, vices, and secret illusions in language of savagely ironic scorn. Though the climax of the work is built on such an exposure, however, Albee seems less interested in the real history of his characters than in the way they conceal and protect their reality: the conflict is also a kind of game, with strict rules, and what they reveal about each other may not be true. This comedy of concealment reminds one of Pirandello, and even more of Jean Genet. For George and Martha – each by turns the aggressor – shift their identities like reptiles shedding skins. And as the evening grows more alcoholic, and the atmosphere more distended and surrealistic, their "total war" becomes a form of ritual play acting, performed upon the shifting sands of truth.

The "setting" for this play-within-a-play is a late night party; the "audience" is composed of a hollow young biology instructor, Nick, and his demure, simpering wife, Honey. A conventionally shallow couple, they are at first innocent bystanders, embarrassed by the squabbling of their hosts, then full participants, as George sadistically exposes *their* guilty secrets: Nick's academic opportunism, Honey's surreptitious abortions. The waspish "fun and games" begin to take the form of ruthlessly aggressive charades. After "Humiliate the Host" and "Get the Guests" comes "Hump the Hostess" as Martha and Nick, in revenge against George, make a feeble attempt to cuckold him in the bedroom. The last episode, "Bringing Up Baby," constitutes George's revenge on Martha – not because she tried to betray him (her infidelities are apparently innumerable), but because she broke one of the rules of the game: she mentioned their "son" to strangers. Forcing Martha to recount the childhood history of this absent youth, George reads the requiem for the dead, climaxing this litany with the announcement that their son has been killed in an auto accident. But the child has never existed. He is merely the essential illusion of the childless Martha, a consoling fiction in her inconsolable reality. The play ends with Honey now determined to have a child, and Martha, submissive and frightened, being comforted by George.

Everyone seems to have boggled at this fictional child; and it is certain that the play collapses at its moment of climax. But the difficulty is not that the author introduces a spurious element into an otherwise truthful play. It is, rather, that he suddenly confronts us with a moment of truth after an evening of stage illusions. Albee's theatri-

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cal inventiveness rests mainly on incongruous juxtapositions: when George aims a shotgun at his braying wife, for example, it shoots not bullets but a Japanese parasol. These shock tactics are a sure-fire comic technique, but they have the effect of alienating the spectator from the action the very moment he begins to accept it. Thus, when George launches a blistering attack on the evils of modern science, Albee undercuts it with a ludicrous non-sequitur: "I will not give up Berlin." And when Martha speaks of her need to escape reality, he has her do do so in a broad Irish brogue. George responds to Martha's infidelity by nonchalantly offering her flowers; he tells a harrowing story of matricide and patricide which is proved, first, to be autobiographical, and second, to be false; and when asked about the telegram announcing his son's death, he claims to have eaten it. Truth and illusion may be confused, as one character tells us, but after three and a half hours of prestidigitation, we become reluctant to accept one of these magical tricks as the real thing. In short, Albee is a highly accomplished stage magician, but he fails to convince us there is nothing up his sleeve. His thematic content is incompatible with his theatrical content – hi-jinks and high seriousness fail to fuse.

On the other hand, the author has a fine time showing off his sleight of hand, incidentally, I suspect, conjuring his action into the outlines of a classical myth (the evidence is jumbled, and I may be crazy, but I think I can detect elements of the story of Aphrodite, Ares, and Hephaestus, mixed with pieces from the story of Aphrodite and Adonis). And he has been provided with a really superb production, deftly managed by Alan Schneider. I have some quibbles about the set, which is too realistic to suggest the phantasmagoric quality of the action; and two of the characters, Nick and Honey, are too sketchily written to be played with much depth (though Melinda Dillon makes a fine caricature out of the giggly wife). But Uta Hagen and Arthur Hill are astonishingly good as the two slashing, trumpeting domestic animals – Miss Hagen crude, ballsy, relentlessly vicious, with a horse laugh like Martha Ray's; Mr. Hill, by turns meek and malicious, driving towards the jugular with a fury born of despair.

In spite of all the excellence of play and production, however, I am left with my equivocal response. In his latest play, Edward Albee proves once again that he has wit, cunning, theatricality, toughness, formal control, poetry – in short, all the qualities of a major dramatist but one: that selfless commitment to a truthful vision of life which constitutes the universal basis of all serious art. Possibly out of fear of such commitments, Albee is still coquetting with his own talent, still resisting any real identification with his own material, so that he tends to confuse his themes, shift his attitudes, and subvert his characters. Yet, a genuine insight, merely sketched in his earlier work is now beginning to find fuller expression: that in a time of deadened instinct, people will use any methods, including deadly hatred, in order to find their way to others. This, or something like it, may become the solid foundation of Albee's future writing; but whatever it is, I await what is to come with eagerness. For if Albee can confront the Medusa head without the aid of parlor tricks or mirrors, he may yet turn us all to stone. ROBERT BRUSTEIN

Correspondence

Hangover in Mississippi

Sirs:

I have read your editorial ("Rebellion in Mississippi," Oct. 8) in which you suggest that if 200 marshals had gone with Meredith on his third attempt to enroll at the University, instead of the few who did accompany him, they could have got past the Lieutenant Governor of Mississippi onto the campus. But what then?

As it is, the moderate business and professional people, who, for business reasons or whatever, had not spoken a word against the regime, though most of them certainly didn't vote for it either, and the old Compson-Sartoris families, who, as Mr. Faulkner pointed out, have not taken an active part in public affairs for years, are now making themselves heard. If the marshals

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had pushed past their Lieutenant Governor, even if they don't like him, it would have been an affront sufficient to keep these moderates silent.

What you don't consider is that unless you intend the federal government to occupy Mississippi on a more or less regular basis for the next 30 years, an alternative to the present political leadership must be found. They aren't all like Barnett in Mississippi, that is, they aren't all Flem Snopeses, in fact they are more like Mink Snopes in that they have standards, they believe in honor, while Flem's only criterion was self aggrandizement. Barnett had disillusioned people who had been his supporters, but in this crisis they stand by him against the federals. Still if the federal government moves slowly, it does give them a chance to leave him if they will. They may decide as Mink did that they have been used; if so that will be the end politically of Flem and his friends. Any government elected in revolt from the present one would have to keep order, that is, protect Meredith and other Mississippi Negroes and those white people who in the last resort would try to protect them.

Two things the President could have done to prevent the recent rioting: one, sent the army with Meredith whenever he decided to use force (200 marshals for the third attempt would not have been enough as they were not on Sunday; those who, you say, were given time between the middle of the week and Sunday to form mobs have, like the students, actually had their whole lives to get ready for they have been reared by segregationist parents, and for about two years the case has been in the courts, where the University administration and a battery of state attorneys were fighting Meredith's admission); and two, not to send Meredith at all.

As for the statement that "enforcement crises must be resolved decisively and promptly so that the futility of resistance is never in the slightest doubt," the state government in Mississippi has not been resisting because it misunderstands this, but because the only claim to the voters' attention that it possesses is that it is keeping the race pure. If Negroes do begin to attend Ole Miss, then it won't be able so easily to stir the voters with this issue, unless it can confuse the issue as it is now trying to do with complaints that the state is being browbeaten by the federal government. If the federal government practices great diplomacy in Mississippi, the voters may repudiate the present occupants of the state house at the next election, or at least by 1967.

Johnette Tracy
Memphis, Tennessee

Labour and the Common Market

Sirs:

Alastair Burnet's article, *Gaitskell Comes Off the Fence* (NR, October 8), tends to be somewhat misleading. He ascribes to Mr. Gaitskell and the Labour Party an "anti-European" view. A view adopted for the tactical partisan benefits it might bring in a forced general election. Although Mr. Gaitskell failed to make plain in his recent broadcast that with good terms labor would support entry, the omission has now been remedied. A Labour Party policy statement on the Common Market was issued by the National Executive Committee which makes clear that Labour's quarrel is with terms and not principle.

Briefly, Labour would have the EEC negotiate trade agreements with India and Pakistan sooner than 1966 and make reasonable provision for New Zealand dairy produce, Australian wheat, and Canadian raw materials. More important, however, Labour would want England to maintain an independent foreign policy, a demand not only at variance with the logic of the Common Market, but which seemingly casts doubt on Labour's intentions.

Although this last point is a major weakness of the policy statement, there seems little to corroborate Mr. Burnet's final estimation of Labour's position: "steadily driven into protectionism and the permanent subsidization of the flagging Victorian industries. . . ."

Jonathan Knight
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

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